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ࡱ> _#` Hbjbj\.\. .>D>D%888L8HL|LZv"$hWP8 R8rT"8 0Ms0 0>8 S&y e ^LLL{LLLLLL THE AFRICAN BRAIN DRAIN: USING INTELLECTUAL DIASPORA TO MANAGE THE DRAIN: WHAT ARE THE OPTIONS? Patrick Onsando Department of Economics and ARM Moi University Eldoret, Kenya Abstract There is an increasing realization that the next society will be a knowledge society, enabled by the rapidly developing information and communications technology. This is despite the fact that the brain drain has brought harmful effects to Africa as some of her best talents have emigrated resulting into lower rates of growth, less productive educational investments and poorer health care. The endogenous growth model supports these effects. There has also been a loss of actual and potential innovators who might have led the way to modernization, as they migrated to educational systems and working environments that have better supported their innovative and creative abilities. This study shows that in order to exploit its full potential, Africa will have to depend increasingly on the acquisition, creation and use of knowledge. However having the storehouse of treasure in the form of knowledge workers is not enough. In order to carry out those functions well, and be on the cutting edge, Africa needs an effective innovation system, linking up with, innovation friendly enterprises the various research units, universities, consultants, and other organizations that are able to access the growing stock of global knowledge and create new knowledge and new technologies. We conclude that, the intellectual Diaspora may constitute a key resource for Africa, by providing contacts of many types, contributing know-how and investments and enhancing international trade and creation of wealth. Introduction Because of low training capacity both in human resources and institutional resources such as small, outmoded laboratories, a large proportion of Africans are still trained outside Africa, exposing them to the challenge of the Brain drain. Millions of Africa Science and technology experts are stuck in western countries as part of this brain drain. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), Africa has already lost one third of its human capital and is continuing to lose its skilled personnel at an increasing rate, with an estimated 20,000 doctors, university lecturers, engineers and other professional leaving the continent annually since 1990.There are currently over 300,000 highly qualified Africans in the Diaspora, 30,000 of which have PhDs. At the same time, Africa spends US$4 billion per year (representing 35% of total official development aid to the continent) to employ some 100,000 Western experts performing functions generically described as technical assistance. For example, expatriates manage 90% of private firms in Gabon. Africa as a whole counts only 20,000 scientists (3.6% percent of the world total) and its share in the worlds scientific output has fallen from 0.5% to 0.3% as it continues to suffer the brain drain of scientists, engineers and technologists. The problem of brain drain has reached quite disturbing proportions in certain African countries, with Ethiopia ranked first in the continent in terms of rate of loss of human capital, followed by Nigeria and Ghana. Over the past 10-15 years, about 50% of Ethiopians who went abroad for training did not return after completing their studies. According to the IOM, Ethiopia lost about 74.6% of its human capital from various institutions between 1980 and 1991. While Ethiopia has 1 full-time economics professor, there are more than 100 Ethiopian economists in the United States. According to the estimates of the Presidential Committee on Brain Drain set up in 1988 by the Babangida administration, Nigeria, between 1986 and 1990, lost over 10,000 academics from tertiary education institutions alone. Total estimates, including those who left public, industrial and private organizations, are over 30,000. 64% of Nigerians in the United States aged 25 and older have at least a bachelors degree. In 1997 only, more than 1,000 professionals left Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwe National Association of Social Workers estimates that 1,500 of the countrys 3,000 trained social workers left for the United Kingdom over the past 10 years. Basically, African countries are funding the education of their nationals only to see them end up contributing to the growth of developed countries with little or no return on their investment. In Kenya, for example, it costs about US$40,000 to train a doctor and US$10,000-15,000 to educate a university student for 4 years. As serious as the consequences of brain drain are for the overall development of the African continent, the health sector is particularly affected; indeed, desperate shortage of health professionals is the most serious obstacle as Africa tries to fight AIDS and support other health programs. In several countries, including Kenya and Ghana, the brain drain of medical professionals is threatening the very existence of the countries health services. Kenya loses on average 20 medical doctors each month. Ghana lost 60% of its medical doctors in the 1980s, 600 to 700 Ghanaian physicians are currently practicing in the USA alone, a figure that represents roughly 50% of the total population of doctors in Ghana. The loss of nurses, in particular, is growing phenomenon, fueled principally by the shortages in developed countries. The United States has 126,000 fewer nurses that it needs and government figures show that the country could face a shortage of 800,000 registered nurses by 2020. Because of such shortages, industrialized nations have embarked on massive international recruitment drives, offering African nurses the opportunity to earn as much as 20 times their salaries. The 1993 UNDP Human Development Report indicated that more than 21,000 Nigerian doctors were practicing in the United States alone while Nigeria suffers from a shortage of doctors. If we were to add the number of Nigerian doctors in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, Europe, Australia and those in other African countries, the figure would be close to 30,000. One third of Ethiopian medical doctors have already left the country. According to Randall Tobias, the United States Governments global AIDS coordinator, there are more Ethiopian-trained doctors practicing in the city of Chicago alone than in Ethiopia. In Zambia, the public sector only retains about 50 out of 600 doctors trained in the countrys medical school. The flight of health professionals is not limited to doctors and affects nurses, pharmacists and social services personnel as well. As we have stated earlier, it is not only the medics that are affected it is the entire spectrum of professionals. African is thus fascinated with how it can utilize the African Diaspora to improve the lot of Africa. Puzzles and challenges include how to mobilize the Diaspora to make a contribution to Africas development, using their considerable intellectual and financial resources. Opportunities and innovations in this area remain to be discovered and harnessed. To acquire the scientific knowledge and technology required for a technological regime, Africa will have to strengthen its capacity to use wisely a mix of channels, including, copying, imitating, duplicating, intelligence gathering, resource engineering, licensing, FDI, partnering networking with the Diaspora, overseas studies, technical assistance and international and regional cooperation. Africa may adapt innovation systems based on a catch-up model which favours the acquisition of advanced technologies from abroad in selected sectors rather than a broader strengthening of its knowledge base. However, reliance on foreign technology results in heavy dependence on foreign sources of materials, parts and components. This limits the beneficial linkage effects and amplifies vulnerability to external shocks. Endogenous Growth Model and The Brain Drain Endogenous innovation models embrace a neo-schumpeterian framework of endogenous technological change based on three premises (Gross man and Helpman, 1991, 1994: Crafts, 1996: Aghion and Howitt, 1998). First, the basic driving force behind economic growth is technological change, that is improvement in knowledge about how we transform inputs into outputs in the production process. Second, technological change is endogenous, being determined by deliberate activities of economic agents acting largely in response to financial incentives. Third, the defining characteristic of ideas/knowledge is that once the cost of creating a new set of instructions has been incurred, the instructions can be used over and over again at no additional cost (Romer 1990). Therefore ideas are non-rivalries outputs and their use by one firm or person does not in any way reduce their availability to other firms or persons. The new growth literature therefore suggests that, the negative implications of a brain drain on the source country are magnified. For example, Hague and Kim (1995) posits that the emigration of people with high levels of human capital reduces the growth rate of the effective human capital that remains in the economy, and thus generates the reduction of the per capita growth in the source country. Under this scenario not only is high skilled labour complementary with capital and low-skilled labour, but high-skilled workers enhance technological innovations and their diffusion. There could also be significant learning by doing. Regardless of the actual modes of learning and progress. The main implication is that a continuous outflow of high skilled labour would deplete the source countrys level of human capital and thus reduce the capacity of the country to achieve as much technological progress as other economies. Scenarios from the standard model of production and endogenous growth models reflect the drain of brains view that dominated migration research from the 1950s to the 1970s. However, these, two scenarios ignore the fact that migration can induce skill formation. The standard and new growth models have been challenged in various theoretical papers that examine the impact of migration on human capital formation within a context of rational migration flows (see Beine et al. 2001, and mount fold 1997). The theory assumes that workers weigh the costs of acquiring skills against prospective market rewards for enhancing skills, both at home and abroad and thus making optimal decisions. Scherer (1999) advocates that human capital is the most important input in the process of advancing technology. A growing body of literature has addressed the complementarities of human capital and technological progress. One of the earliest models developed is by Nelson and Phelps (1966), which suggested what the level of education, speeds up technological diffusion. Their simple illustration was that of an educated farmer, possessing ability to discern profitable ideas and thus adopting new processes or products more quickly than his uneducated counterpart. Benhabib and Spiegel (2002), using cross data obtains results consistent to Nelson and Phelps hypothesis and extends the role of human capital to be an engine of domestic innovation besides being a facilitator of technology adoption. Romer (1990) challenges and augments the Solow neoclassical growth model, which assumes technology to be exogenous and hence available without limitation everywhere across the globe. In order to explain continuous growth of output per worker in the long run the Solow model must incorporate the influence of sustainable technological progress. Y = AtKL1- (1) Where. Q and 1-Q are weights reflecting the share of capital and labour in the national income. Assuming constant returns to scale, and for a given technology, At0, output per worker is positively related to the capital-labour ratio (K/L). We can therefore rewrite the production function equation (1) in terms of output per worker as shown by (2) Y/L = A(t0)(K/L)=A(t0)KL1-/L=A(t0)(K/L) (2) Letting y = Y/L and k = K/L, we have the  intensive form of the aggregate production. y=A(t0)k (3) For a given technology, equation (3) tells us that increasing the amount of capital per worker (capital deepening) will lead to an increase in output per worker. Fig 1. Technological progress  y = Y/L  A(t1)k  yb  A(t0)k  ya  ka k = K/L The impact of exogenous technological progress is illustrated in figure 1 by a shift of the production function between two time periods (t0 =>t1) from A(t0)k to A(t1)k, raising output per worker from ya to yb for a given capital-labour ratio of ka. Continuous upward shifts of the production function, induced by an exogenously determined growth of knowledge, provide the only mechanism for explaining steady state growth of output per worker in the neoclassical model. Continuous upward shifts of the production function, induced by an exogenous determined a growth of knowledge, provides the only mechanism for explaining steady growth of output per worker in the neoclassical model. Insights on the impacts of technology on production are also provided by (Kumar and Rusell) decomposition. This decomposition exploits the assumption of constant returns to scale, in which case the benchmark technology sets can be drawn in space, where k = K/L and y = Y/L. Using these hypothetical technologies for two periods, as we have already shown, say a base period b and a current period c, are drawn in figure 2. In this example, the single kink in each of the polyhedral technologies would indicate that a single economy the only efficient economy defines the frontier. The two points (kb, yb) and (kc, yc), represent observed values of the two ratios in the two periods for some hypothetical economy. Fig 2. Tripartite Decomposition.  y  Yc(kc) D T  Yc  Yc(kb) E  Yb(kc) C  Yb(kb) B  yb A  0 kb kc k By construction, potential outputs for this economy in the two periods are 3b(kb) = yb/eb and 3c(kc) = yc /ec, where eb and ec are the values of the efficiency indexes in the two periods, calculated as in (2) above. Therefore,  EMBED Equation.3   EMBED Equation.3  (3) Multiplying top and bottom by 3b(kc), the potential output-labor ratio at current-period capital intensity using the base-period technology, we obtain  EMBED Equation.3  (4) This identity decomposes the relative change in the output-labor ratio in the two periods into (i) the change in efficiency i.e., the change in the distance from the frontier (the first term on the right); (ii) the technology change i.e., the shift in the frontier (the second term; and (iii) the effect of the change in the capital-labor ratio-i.e., movement along the frontier (the third term). The decomposition in (4) measures technological change by the shift in the frontier in the output direction at the current-period capital-labor ratio-from point C to point D in Figure 2-and it measures the effect of capital accumulation along the base-period frontier-from point B to point C. we can alternatively measure technological change at the base-period capital-labor ratio-from point B to point E in Figure 2-and capital accumulation by movements along the current-period frontier-from point E to point D-by multiplying the top and bottom of (3) by the potential output-labor ratio at base-period capital intensity using the current-period technology, 3c(kb), yielding the decomposition,  EMBED Equation.3  (5) Thus, the decomposition of (discrete) productivity changes (not attributable to efficiency changes) into the technological-change and capital-deepening components is path dependent, and the choice between (4) and (5) is arbitrary. There is no avoiding this arbitrariness, unless technological change is Hicks neutral, in which case the proportional vertical shift in the frontier is independent of the value of the capital-labor ratio. It is this assumption (along with constant returns to scale) that enabled Solow (1957), and the legions of growth accountants who have followed his lead, to unambiguously decompose productivity growth into components attributable to technological change and capital deepening. But without constraining technological change to be Hicks neutral, the proportional (vertical) shift in the frontier varies in unspecified ways. In fact, this arbitrariness is not, per se, attributable to the decomposition itself. It is endemic to the basic task of measuring technological change, as is evident in the necessity of normalizing on one of two technologies in the (Malmquist) productivity index proposed in the pioneering paper of Doughlas W. Caves et al. (1982a). Within this framework it is inferred that technological innovation is a chronic disturber of comparatives and the rules of the game are rapidly changing. The emerging trends have far reaching implications for Africas sustainable development and competitiveness. Global firms are steadily upgrading their technological capacity and performance and progressively raising entry barriers to new entrants. In this process inefficient producers such as African ones, are often squeezed out. Africas competitiveness in its traditional areas of comparative advantage is eroding. This is well documented; The continents share of global export trade fell from 5.9% in 1980 to less than 2% at the end of the 1990s, while sub-Saharan Africas market share at global manufacturing value added (MVA) was halved from 0.69% in 1970 to a low 0.3% in he 1990s. Globalization and liberalization compel companies to compete not only in foreign markets in order to prosper, but also in their own national markets. Africa, therefore, needs to act promptly to counter the possibilities of this double internal and external squeeze. Causes and Impacts of Brain Drain Causes It is acknowledged that a variety of factors shape international mobility of labour. Khadria (2004) in his survey of health professionals in New Delhi reported that the primary motive of out-migration for doctors related to training and career opportunities, compared to nurses that focused on improved income prospects and quality of life. Similar patterns were reported amongst Ghanaian nurses and doctors (Mensah et al. 2005: 28). It is not clear whether these differences relate to the distinctive labour market context of each occupation or whether other factors related to gender and other workforce attributes that influence the motives of migrant health professionals. A widely used framework to analyse health professionals mobility differentiates between push and pull factors. Push factors focus on those pay, working conditions and broader management and governance factors that encourage health professionals to exit their own health systems and leave their country. More comprehensive analyses incorporate factors that push health professionals to shift from rural to urban areas, from public to private sector employment and at times out of the profession altogether as part of the interplay between internal and out-migration. Pull factors direct attention to the factors that encourage health professionals to move to other countries, including shortages and active recruitment from high-income countries. This framework, with its roots in neoclassical economic orthodoxy, focuses on individual migrant behaviour in terms of economic utility maximization; especially wage differentials between source and destination countries. A focus on the individualistic calculations of migrants needs to be complemented by awareness of how structural factors influence migration patterns. The reform of health systems, often as part of programmes of structural adjustment and the liberalization of trade in health services are contributing to the restructuring of labour markets for health professionals. These patterns of restructuring influence mobility indicating that migrants choices are underpinned by the ways in which nation states are integrated into the global economy (Van Eyck 2004: 9-10). The case of Ghana has been used to illustrate how its health professionals have become integrated into a global market. The integration process is indicated by: potential migrants being able to make informed comparisons of wages and conditions across countries; increased private investment in employment agencies to facilitate international recruitment; information on migration processes being widely available; and the existence of feedback effects in terms of upward pressure on wages and conditions in the source country (Mensah et al. 2005: 16-19). Causes of brain drain may be summarized as follows; Push Factors Low and eroding wages and salaries Unsatisfactory living conditions, lack of transport, housing, etc Under-utilization of qualified personnel; lack of satisfactory working conditions; low prospect of professional development Lack of research and other facilities, including support staff; inadequacy of research funds, lack of professional equipment and tools Social unrest, Political conflicts and wars Declining quality of educational system Discrimination in appointments and promotions Lack of freedom Pull Factors Higher wages and income Higher standard of living Better working conditions; job and career opportunities and professional development Substantial funds for research, advanced technology, modern facilities; availability of experienced support staff Political stability Modern educational system; prestige of foreign training Meritocracy, transparency Intellectual freedom Impacts The brain drain crises can also be seen as a process that Africa can theoretically capitalize on. Virtually all of Africas major export sectors are struggling to compete on world markets, yet without any policy effort whatsoever Africa has demonstrated its competitiveness in the training (or production) of doctors and nurses. Such exports allow Africa to bypass the formal trade facilitation challenges (from the world trade organization) that so hamper exports. The mobility of highly skilled labour is associated with a number of positive feed back effects as skilled emigrants continue to affect the economy of their origin country. The main benefits are associated with the remittance of income, the knowledge and skills acquired by returnees, and spillover effects when migration increases the urge to obtain higher education, increasing the stock of education in the source country, with only a proportional of this accumulation of skills lost to out-migration (see mountfold 1997). An illustration of these spill-over effects is the degree in which the educational level of applicants in nursing schools in Ghana has risen to the equivalent entrance level and the number of applicants has also risen sharply, as applicants start to view a nursing qualification as an investment in leaving the country (Mensah et al. 2005:19). We also summarize the impacts of the brain drain as follows: Negative Reduces the already low quantity of skilled manpower available in Africa countries and needed for their development Reduces numbers of dynamic and innovative people, whether entrepreneurs or academics Increases dependence on foreign technical assistance Slows the transfer of technology and widens the gap between African and industrialized countries Negatively affects the continents scientific output Money lost in income tax revenues and in potential contributions to gross domestic product. Positive Contribution of new skills when migrants return Remittances from skilled migrants boosts household welfare Remittances support the balance of payments. Remittances. Remittances are financial flows into households that do not require a quid-pro-quo in economic value (Addison, 2005). They are usually valued as private financial aid that flows directly into the hands of households and the fact that they tend to be counter cyclical suggests that very often they serve as an important source of both income and consumption smoothing strategies for vulnerable poor and non-poor households. Similarly, the literature analyzing the impact of remittance flows shows that these flows are beneficial at all levels the individual, the household, the local community and the national level and indicates that if well managed they can help reduce poverty at these four levels. Buch and Kuckulenz (2002) also report that worker remittances constitute an increasingly important mechanism for the transfer of resources from developed to developing countries is second largest source behind foreign direct investment of external funding for developing countries. Rathar (2003) corroborates the point that migrants may increase remittances in times of economic hardship, especially in low-income countries where their families live at close to subsidence levels may depend significantly on remittances as a source of income. Rather observes that economic downturns may also encourage workers abroad and thereby begin to transfer funds to families left behind. He further argues that while capital flows to rise during favourable economic cycles and fall in bad times, remittances appear to react less violently and show remarkable stability over time. For example, he shows that remittances to developing countries continued to rise steadily, especially during 1998 2001, a period characterized by a decline in private capital flows in the wake of the Asian financial crisis. Thus remittances foreign exchange reserves. They thereby offset some of the output losses or economic shocks that a developing country may suffer from emigration of its highly skilled workers. Negative economic shocks tend to have spill over effects on various sections of an economy. The poor suffer disproportionately from shocks because they generally have limited savings and access to credit. They also rely heavily on public social services, which deteriorate as spending becomes constrained and their limited skills mean higher income shortfalls. In addition to physical damage and income losses, Happe et al. (2003) indicate that these shocks also have indirect effects that can reverberate through an economy, hampering output and investment, upsetting macroeconomic balances, and increasing dept and poverty over a number of years. The type and magnitude of indirect effects will depend on the size and duration of a shock, whether measures were taken in advance in mitigate its impact, the governments policy response and the amount and form a external assistance a country receives. Estimating these effects can be tricky, however because it is difficult both to identify the channels through which they are transmitted and to isolate the magnitude of impact, especially when more than one shock has affected an economy or when an economy is recovering from a prior shock. Through direct and indirect effects, shocks can significantly impede growth. Managing the Drain.What are the options? The brain drain has brought harmful effects to many countries as some of their best talents have emigrated. Some of the consequences have been lower rates of growth, less productive educational investments and poorer health care. There has also been a loss of actual and potential innovators who might have led the way to modernization, as they migrated to educational systems and working environments that better supported their innovative and creative abilities. The conception about the migration of skills is now evolving, putting stronger emphasis on brain gain, which is based on the idea that the expatriate skilled population may be considered as a potential asset instead of a definite loss. There are main options to implement the brain gain either through the return of the expatriates to the country of origin (return option) or through their remote mobilization and association to its development (diaspora option). The return option has been successfully realized in various new industrialized countries (NICs) such as Singapore and the republic of Korea or big developing countries such as France and China (Charum, Meyes eds, 1999). Strong programmes to repatriate many of their skilled nationals abroad have been put in place since 1980. They have created at home the network in which these returnees could effectively find a place and be operational. The experience of the Asian countries like the republic of Korea, Singapore and Taiwan, can provide very useful lessons from which African countries can learn a lot. These nations did set up incentive schemes and mechanisms within a benign socio-economic framework that helped to attract back home quite a lot of their own highly trained expatriate people from the various industrialized countries who helped to fuel the revival of agriculture, commerce, higher education and hi-tech research within these nations and to transform them into the so called newly industrializing countries (MICS). However, the IOM highlights difficulties of facilitating return in relation to African professionals abroad. The challenges highlighted include prolonged job search arising from cumbersome processes, lack of trust in African government amongst the diaspora, and weak government ownership. (IOM cited in WHO/World Bank). The diaspora option is based on network approaches where a network can be defined as a regular set of contacts or similar connections among individual actors or groups (Granoveltes and Suedberg; 1922:9). These networks of highly skilled expatriates are referred to as expatriate knowledge networks. The main feature of the diaspora option is that it tries to set up connections/linkages between highly skilled expatriates and between them and the country of origin. This allows for information and knowledge exchange between expatriates and between them and the country of origin. It allows expatriates the opportunity to transfer their expertise and skills to the country of origin without necessarily returning home permanently. In this way the country of origin has access to the knowledge and expertise of the expatriate, but also the knowledge networks that he/she forms part of in the host country. A crucial element of the diaspora option is therefore an effective system of information to facilitate transfer and exchange of information between network members and between them and their counterparts in the country of origin. Intellectual diaspora members therefore can enable and promote collaboration with African people, institutions and enterprises However diaspora option requires good organizations of networks to ensure communication information exchange and coordinated actions. This is where an interface or coordinating body becomes necessary. The function of such a coordinating body would be to collect, organize and maintain the information needed for the systematic search of partnerships, but also o manage and promote the interests and actions of the multiple entities in a network of this kind. Diaspora option is based on information transfer, and studies have shown that, the next society will be a knowledge society, enabled by the rapidly developing information and communications technology. According to Peter Drucker, it will have highly competitive characteristics and will use knowledge as a key resource. Knowledge has become the most important factor for international competitiveness, the creation of wealth and the improvement of living conditions. The knowledge society will rely heavily on knowledge workers, both traditional professionals like doctors, scientists and engineers, and also "knowledge technologists" such as IT technicians, lab analysts and manufacturing experts, who need a basis of theoretical knowledge acquired through formal education. Innovation, a knowledge-intensive endeavor, requires creative people to put knowledge to work. It also needs a favorable environment. A culture of innovation has indeed become a prerequisite of development in the 21st century. "To understand peoples ability to innovate and their ability to adapt to change", says a recent report from UNESCO, "one has to take into account the social and cultural components of innovation, our environment - including our belief and value systems - shapes the way we view the world around us and determines how we react to ongoing change. Technological change has often-overlooked social effect or consequence; namely, it alters social hierarchies and the power structure of groups within society and in some cases society itself In order to understand peoples ability to innovate and their ability to adapt to change, one has to take into account the social and cultural components of innovation. In the end, these factors are the tools that enable us to create a culture of innovation". The experience of many countries has clearly shown that the loss of high level people cannot be stemmed successfully by restricting mobility, but rather by a favorable political and economic climate together with better work facilities, adequate pay and advancement through merit. This helps retain exceptional talents within the country and utilize them for the countrys benefit. It may also help to bring back some of those who had previously emigrated. Members of the intellectual Diaspora may be induced to participate actively in new, innovative productive ventures in the home country. Emigrants that have accumulated abundant capital, developed novel technologies, and generated successful enterprises may be willing to create new ventures at home on the basis of such resources, often in association with a local partner, if there is true support for these efforts. A promotional mechanism and adequate incentives may help here, such as has happened in Korea, Taiwan and China, where the respective governments have catalyzed and nurtured such initiatives. Several "brain exporting" countries have become aware of these potential benefits, and are attempting to organize their intellectual Diasporas so as to better utilize their high level nationals abroad. This requires a significant effort to survey the Diasporas human resources, create an active network, and develop specific activities and programs. China, Colombia, South Africa (with the motto transform brain drain into brain gain) and to a lesser extent other countries are putting efforts into this. India has also embarked on a similar enterprise. It has begun the process admirably, and should follow up with intensive, creative efforts to connect the network in meaningful endeavors in order to effectively assist the country. Even more can be done by identifying those members of the Diaspora who have acquired exceptional innovative capabilities, utilizing them to spur the home country talents to a more innovative level, and providing easier access, open attitudes and opportunities to bring about meaningful change. Within the intellectual Diaspora, some individuals have developed truly innovative capabilities. We may call them Diaspora innovators having acquired cultural traits and specific knowledge that are essential to innovation in science, technology, education and entrepreneurship."Diaspora innovators" who have studied and worked for extended periods in a modern, open innovative environment have acquired different beliefs and values from those of their original societies. They view the world differently and are able to react to ongoing changes in a more flexible, dynamic and positive manner. Many have acquired good managerial expertise and technological competence, as well as "cultural literacy (the ability to recognize and exploit social, cultural, lifestyle, and ethnic distinctions)" and "a reflexive approach to knowledge and practices" (UNESCO). These core competencies are crucial in creating a culture of innovation. Diaspora innovators indeed embody a specific capital that may be tapped for the purpose of building a culture of innovation in the home country, and thus contribute to developing a knowledge society there. Conclusions and Policy Implications Supply of well-qualified labour is a key ingredient in the generation and diffusion of innovation. Increased human capital only raises labour productivity, but also serves as a driver of technological progress through a significantly positive effect on business sector R&D. The OECD Growth Study estimated that the long run effect on GDP per capita of one additional year of education ranges from 4% o 7% (OECD, 2003g). Governments invest in its citizens human capital through training and education and expect a return on their investment when the individual becomes economically and start paying taxes. Within this perspective migration of highly skilled human resources present a loss to the sending country, because they loss out on returns on the capital they invested in the individual. However, the intellectual diaspora takes a fundamentally different stance to traditional perspectives on the brain drain in that it sees the brain drain not as a loss but a potential gain to the sending country. To realize its full potential, there is need for a democratization and domestication of science and technology in Africa. All key stakeholders must be involved, through national dialogues, in the policy formulation and implementation process, so as to transcend policies that tend to be too narrowly focused on a few number of isolated, ill-equipped and under paid researched and academicians. This will contribute to moving a way from elitist policies, and to defining and strengthening the respective role of public institutions, international partners, universities, NGOs, women organizations, civil society and the private sector. It would also ensure that policies are tailored primarily with a view to meeting specific needs of end-users and clients. ANNEX; Reference Tables Table 1.Emigration of Skilled Africans to Industrialized Countries Time PeriodAverage Annual RateTotal Number1960-19741,80027,0001975-19844,00040,0001985-198912,00060,000Since 199020,000--Source: IOM Table 2 Intellectual Diaspora Network CountryName of NetworkType of NetworkArab CountriesThe Network of Arab Scientists and Technologists Abroad (ASTA)Intell/Scien Diaspora NetworkArgentinaPrograma para la Vinculacion con Cientificos y Tecnicos Argentinos en el Exterior (Program for the Linkage of Argentine Scientists and Technologists Abroad) (PROCITEXT)Developing Intell/Scien Diaspora NetworkAssamTransfer of knowledge and Technology to AssamTOK TEN ProgrammeChinaChinese Scholars Abroad (CHISA) Society of Chinese Bioscientists in America Chinese American Engineers and Scientists Association of Southern California (CESASC)Student/Scholarly Network Local Association of Expatriates Local Association of ExpatriatesColombiaThe Colombian Network of Researchers and Engineers Abroad (Red Caldas)Intell/Scien Diaspora NetworkEl SalvadorConectandonos al Futuro de El Salvador (Connecting to El Salvodor?s FutureDeveloping Intell/Scien Diaspora NetworkFranceSillicon Valley Indian Professionals Association (SIPA) Worldwide Indian Network The international Associaion of Scientists and Engineers and Technologists of Bharatiya Origin Interface for Non Resident Indian Scientists and Technoligists Programme (INRIST)Local Association of Expatriates Intell/Scien Diaspora Network Developing Intell/Scien Diaspora Network Developing Intell/Scien Diaspora Networks IranThe Iranian Scholars Scientific Information NetworkIntell/Scien Diaspora NetworkIrelandThe Irish Research Scientists? Association (IRSA)Intell/Scien Diaspora NetworkJapanJapanese Associate Network (JANET)Student/Scholarly NetworkKenyaAssociation of Kenyans Abroad (AKA)Developing Intell/Scien Diaspora NetworkKoreaKorean Scientists Engineers Association of Sacramento Valley The Global Korean NetworkLocal Association of Expatriates Intell/Scien Diaspora NetworkLatin AmericaAsociation I.attino-americaine de Scientifiques (Latin American Association of Scientists) (ALAS)Intell/Scien Diaspora NetworkLebanonTOKTEN for LebanonTOKTEN ProgrammeMoroccoMoroccan Association of Researchers and Scholars Abroad (MARS)Student/Scholarly NetworkNigeriaAssociation of Nigerians Abroad (A.N.A)Intell/Scien Diaspora NetworkNorwayAssociation of Norwegian StudentsStudent/Scholarly NetworkPakistanReturn of Qualified Expatriate Nationals to PakistanTOKTEN ProgrammePalestineProgramme of Assistance to the Palestine PeopleTOKTEN ProgrammePeruRed Cientifica Peruana (Peruvian Scientific Network)Developing Intell/Scien Diaspora NetworkPhilippinesBrain Gain Network (BGN)Intell/Scien Diaspora NetworkPolandThe Polish Scientists AbroadIntell/Scien Diaspora NetworkRomaniaThe Forum for Science and Reform (FORS)Developing Intell/Scien Diaspora NetworkSouth AfricaThe South African Network of Skills Abroad (SANSA)Intell/Scien Diaspora NetworkThailandThe Reverse Brain Drain Project (RBD) Association of Thai Professionals in America and Canada (ATPAC) The Association of Thai Professionals in Europe (ATPER) The Association of Thai Professionals in Japan (ATPIJ)Developing Intell/Scien. Diaspora Network Intell/Scien Diaspora Network Intell/Scien Diaspora Network Intell/Scien Diaspora Network TunisiaThe Tunisian Scientific Consortium (TSC)Intell/Scien Diaspora NetworkUruguayRed Academica Uruguaya (Uruguayan Academic Network)Developing Intell/Scien Diaspora NetworkVenezuelaIn contact with Venezuela El Programa Talento Venezolano en el Extrior (Program of Venezuelan Talents Abroad) (TALVEN)Developing Intell/Scien Diaspora Networks Table 3 Country of medical school of sub-Saharan African international medical graduates (IMGs) in the US and Canada Country of trainingNumber of African trained IMGs in USNumber of trained IMGs in CanadaNumber of physicians remaining in home country% of total African trained now in US or CanadaNigeria2158123228949South Africa194318452384414Ghana47837121030Ethiopia2579156415Uganda1334272220Kenya931940013Zimbabwe752616946Liberia4787243Other 12 countries*8335129121Total/average533421516558910Source: Hagopiuan et al. (2004: 5) Note:*other 12 countries with at least one graduate in the United States. Table 4 Overseas trained nurses registered per annum in the UK 1998-2005 (Excluding the European Union) Country1998/991999/20002000/012001/022002/032003/042004/05India3096289994183030733690Philippines52105233967235559343382521Australia13351209104613429201326981South Africa59914601086211413681689933Nigeria179208347432509511466West Indies221425261248208397352Zimbabwe52221382473485391311New Zealand527461393443282348289Ghana4074140195251354272Pakistan31344207172140205Zambia154088183133169162US13916814712288141105Mauritius61541625995102Kenya19295015515214699Botswana4-87100399091Canada1961308979528988Nepal214373Swaziland8169China60Malawi1154575576452Others637495Total36215945840315,06412,73014,122211,416Source: NMC (2005). Listed by most numerous country applicants in 2004-05 Bibliography Adams R.H. 2006. Remittances and poverty in Ghana. World bank Working Paper WPS 3838, World Bank, Washington, D.C. 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AManoyÕʕ͕Ε )*9xJstzcɘ./;NOT)CDJn45CÝĝ̝ߝ8RS[˞$56@p )*1NlmuƠǠԠ%&/ڢۢ@AK£cw$)-356CHMSVW]adilmvz|åťƥΥѥӥ֥٥ڥ '/78>ADHLQV[\hkpuzçģ̌ѧ֧ۧ "&*.23<?CGKOSWXdhlptx|èĨ˨ΨѨԨبܨ#$*-037;?BCLNPSWZ]`ahlpsvy|éƩɩ̩ϩҩթ֩ݩީߩNormaluwc2Microsoft Office Word@ @0z@`a@`a#՜.+,D՜.+,8 hp|  z+  INTRODUCTION Title  8@ _PID_HLINKSA Z26$http://www.uneca.org/eca_resources/ 63\http://www.gdnet.org/pdf2/gdn_library/global_research_projects/macro_low_income/Quartey.pdf 09http://www.phrusa.oirg/campaigns/aids/pdf/braindrain.pdf 2 -4http://www.ghanaian-chronicle.com/230313/page2d.htm f`*@http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/voll7no2/172brain.htm ^e'7http://www.central.sussex.ac.uk/Units/SCMR/Working_pap Z$5http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/2/1/17  !Ahttp://www.braingain-instruments.nl/docs/Ngu-AfricaBrainGain.doc ./Dhttp://www.panapress.com/newslatf.asp?code=eng059343&dte=09/10/2004 )m4http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/2/1/7 ' ;http://www.worldbank.org/afr/teia/conf_0903/dela_dovlo.pdf D1http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/30/098.html vx+http://www.treasury.govt.nz/workingpapers/ T*http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/3751034.stm /v 0http://www.globalhealthrust.org/publication.htm @Ь-./0178<=p@p6p8p:p<p|@pDp@pJp@p@UnknownGz Times New Roman5Symbol3& z ArialQ& {aMicrosoft Sans Serif7GeorgiaI& ??Arial Unicode MS?5 z Courier New;Wingdings"1hēFēFDt#z#z!4d++2QHX ? 2 INTRODUCTIONUseruwc      FMicrosoft Office Word Document MSWordDocWord.Document.89q
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ࡱ> _#` Hbjbj\.\. .>D>D%888L8HL|LZv"$hWP8 R8rT"8 0Ms0 0>8 S&y e ^LLL{LLLLLL THE AFRICAN BRAIN DRAIN: USING INTELLECTUAL DIASPORA TO MANAGE THE DRAIN: WHAT ARE THE OPTIONS? Patrick Onsando Department of Economics and ARM Moi University Eldoret, Kenya Abstract There is an increasing realization that the next society will be a knowledge society, enabled by the rapidly developing information and communications technology. This is despite the fact that the brain drain has brought harmful effects to Africa as some of her best talents have emigrated resulting into lower rates of growth, less productive educational investments and poorer health care. The endogenous growth model supports these effects. There has also been a loss of actual and potential innovators who might have led the way to modernization, as they migrated to educational systems and working environments that have better supported their innovative and creative abilities. This study shows that in order to exploit its full potential, Africa will have to depend increasingly on the acquisition, creation and use of knowledge. However having the storehouse of treasure in the form of knowledge workers is not enough. In order to carry out those functions well, and be on the cutting edge, Africa needs an effective innovation system, linking up with, innovation friendly enterprises the various research units, universities, consultants, and other organizations that are able to access the growing stock of global knowledge and create new knowledge and new technologies. We conclude that, the intellectual Diaspora may constitute a key resource for Africa, by providing contacts of many types, contributing know-how and investments and enhancing international trade and creation of wealth. Introduction Because of low training capacity both in human resources and institutional resources such as small, outmoded laboratories, a large proportion of Africans are still trained outside Africa, exposing them to the challenge of the Brain drain. Millions of Africa Science and technology experts are stuck in western countries as part of this brain drain. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), Africa has already lost one third of its human capital and is continuing to lose its skilled personnel at an increasing rate, with an estimated 20,000 doctors, university lecturers, engineers and other professional leaving the continent annually since 1990.There are currently over 300,000 highly qualified Africans in the Diaspora, 30,000 of which have PhDs. At the same time, Africa spends US$4 billion per year (representing 35% of total official development aid to the continent) to employ some 100,000 Western experts performing functions generically described as technical assistance. For example, expatriates manage 90% of private firms in Gabon. Africa as a whole counts only 20,000 scientists (3.6% percent of the world total) and its share in the worlds scientific output has fallen from 0.5% to 0.3% as it continues to suffer the brain drain of scientists, engineers and technologists. The problem of brain drain has reached quite disturbing proportions in certain African countries, with Ethiopia ranked first in the continent in terms of rate of loss of human capital, followed by Nigeria and Ghana. Over the past 10-15 years, about 50% of Ethiopians who went abroad for training did not return after completing their studies. According to the IOM, Ethiopia lost about 74.6% of its human capital from various institutions between 1980 and 1991. While Ethiopia has 1 full-time economics professor, there are more than 100 Ethiopian economists in the United States. According to the estimates of the Presidential Committee on Brain Drain set up in 1988 by the Babangida administration, Nigeria, between 1986 and 1990, lost over 10,000 academics from tertiary education institutions alone. Total estimates, including those who left public, industrial and private organizations, are over 30,000. 64% of Nigerians in the United States aged 25 and older have at least a bachelors degree. In 1997 only, more than 1,000 professionals left Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwe National Association of Social Workers estimates that 1,500 of the countrys 3,000 trained social workers left for the United Kingdom over the past 10 years. Basically, African countries are funding the education of their nationals only to see them end up contributing to the growth of developed countries with little or no return on their investment. In Kenya, for example, it costs about US$40,000 to train a doctor and US$10,000-15,000 to educate a university student for 4 years. As serious as the consequences of brain drain are for the overall development of the African continent, the health sector is particularly affected; indeed, desperate shortage of health professionals is the most serious obstacle as Africa tries to fight AIDS and support other health programs. In several countries, including Kenya and Ghana, the brain drain of medical professionals is threatening the very existence of the countries health services. Kenya loses on average 20 medical doctors each month. Ghana lost 60% of its medical doctors in the 1980s, 600 to 700 Ghanaian physicians are currently practicing in the USA alone, a figure that represents roughly 50% of the total population of doctors in Ghana. The loss of nurses, in particular, is growing phenomenon, fueled principally by the shortages in developed countries. The United States has 126,000 fewer nurses that it needs and government figures show that the country could face a shortage of 800,000 registered nurses by 2020. Because of such shortages, industrialized nations have embarked on massive international recruitment drives, offering African nurses the opportunity to earn as much as 20 times their salaries. The 1993 UNDP Human Development Report indicated that more than 21,000 Nigerian doctors were practicing in the United States alone while Nigeria suffers from a shortage of doctors. If we were to add the number of Nigerian doctors in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, Europe, Australia and those in other African countries, the figure would be close to 30,000. One third of Ethiopian medical doctors have already left the country. According to Randall Tobias, the United States Governments global AIDS coordinator, there are more Ethiopian-trained doctors practicing in the city of Chicago alone than in Ethiopia. In Zambia, the public sector only retains about 50 out of 600 doctors trained in the countrys medical school. The flight of health professionals is not limited to doctors and affects nurses, pharmacists and social services personnel as well. As we have stated earlier, it is not only the medics that are affected it is the entire spectrum of professionals. African is thus fascinated with how it can utilize the African Diaspora to improve the lot of Africa. Puzzles and challenges include how to mobilize the Diaspora to make a contribution to Africas development, using their considerable intellectual and financial resources. Opportunities and innovations in this area remain to be discovered and harnessed. To acquire the scientific knowledge and technology required for a technological regime, Africa will have to strengthen its capacity to use wisely a mix of channels, including, copying, imitating, duplicating, intelligence gathering, resource engineering, licensing, FDI, partnering networking with the Diaspora, overseas studies, technical assistance and international and regional cooperation. Africa may adapt innovation systems based on a catch-up model which favours the acquisition of advanced technologies from abroad in selected sectors rather than a broader strengthening of its knowledge base. However, reliance on foreign technology results in heavy dependence on foreign sources of materials, parts and components. This limits the beneficial linkage effects and amplifies vulnerability to external shocks. Endogenous Growth Model and The Brain Drain Endogenous innovation models embrace a neo-schumpeterian framework of endogenous technological change based on three premises (Gross man and Helpman, 1991, 1994: Crafts, 1996: Aghion and Howitt, 1998). First, the basic driving force behind economic growth is technological change, that is improvement in knowledge about how we transform inputs into outputs in the production process. Second, technological change is endogenous, being determined by deliberate activities of economic agents acting largely in response to financial incentives. Third, the defining characteristic of ideas/knowledge is that once the cost of creating a new set of instructions has been incurred, the instructions can be used over and over again at no additional cost (Romer 1990). Therefore ideas are non-rivalries outputs and their use by one firm or person does not in any way reduce their availability to other firms or persons. The new growth literature therefore suggests that, the negative implications of a brain drain on the source country are magnified. For example, Hague and Kim (1995) posits that the emigration of people with high levels of human capital reduces the growth rate of the effective human capital that remains in the economy, and thus generates the reduction of the per capita growth in the source country. Under this scenario not only is high skilled labour complementary with capital and low-skilled labour, but high-skilled workers enhance technological innovations and their diffusion. There could also be significant learning by doing. Regardless of the actual modes of learning and progress. The main implication is that a continuous outflow of high skilled labour would deplete the source countrys level of human capital and thus reduce the capacity of the country to achieve as much technological progress as other economies. Scenarios from the standard model of production and endogenous growth models reflect the drain of brains view that dominated migration research from the 1950s to the 1970s. However, these, two scenarios ignore the fact that migration can induce skill formation. The standard and new growth models have been challenged in various theoretical papers that examine the impact of migration on human capital formation within a context of rational migration flows (see Beine et al. 2001, and mount fold 1997). The theory assumes that workers weigh the costs of acquiring skills against prospective market rewards for enhancing skills, both at home and abroad and thus making optimal decisions. Scherer (1999) advocates that human capital is the most important input in the process of advancing technology. A growing body of literature has addressed the complementarities of human capital and technological progress. One of the earliest models developed is by Nelson and Phelps (1966), which suggested what the level of education, speeds up technological diffusion. Their simple illustration was that of an educated farmer, possessing ability to discern profitable ideas and thus adopting new processes or products more quickly than his uneducated counterpart. Benhabib and Spiegel (2002), using cross data obtains results consistent to Nelson and Phelps hypothesis and extends the role of human capital to be an engine of domestic innovation besides being a facilitator of technology adoption. Romer (1990) challenges and augments the Solow neoclassical growth model, which assumes technology to be exogenous and hence available without limitation everywhere across the globe. In order to explain continuous growth of output per worker in the long run the Solow model must incorporate the influence of sustainable technological progress. Y = AtKL1- (1) Where. Q and 1-Q are weights reflecting the share of capital and labour in the national income. Assuming constant returns to scale, and for a given technology, At0, output per worker is positively related to the capital-labour ratio (K/L). We can therefore rewrite the production function equation (1) in terms of output per worker as shown by (2) Y/L = A(t0)(K/L)=A(t0)KL1-/L=A(t0)(K/L) (2) Letting y = Y/L and k = K/L, we have the  intensive form of the aggregate production. y=A(t0)k (3) For a given technology, equation (3) tells us that increasing the amount of capital per worker (capital deepening) will lead to an increase in output per worker. Fig 1. Technological progress  y = Y/L  A(t1)k  yb  A(t0)k  ya  ka k = K/L The impact of exogenous technological progress is illustrated in figure 1 by a shift of the production function between two time periods (t0 =>t1) from A(t0)k to A(t1)k, raising output per worker from ya to yb for a given capital-labour ratio of ka. Continuous upward shifts of the production function, induced by an exogenously determined growth of knowledge, provide the only mechanism for explaining steady state growth of output per worker in the neoclassical model. Continuous upward shifts of the production function, induced by an exogenous determined a growth of knowledge, provides the only mechanism for explaining steady growth of output per worker in the neoclassical model. Insights on the impacts of technology on production are also provided by (Kumar and Rusell) decomposition. This decomposition exploits the assumption of constant returns to scale, in which case the benchmark technology sets can be drawn in space, where k = K/L and y = Y/L. Using these hypothetical technologies for two periods, as we have already shown, say a base period b and a current period c, are drawn in figure 2. In this example, the single kink in each of the polyhedral technologies would indicate that a single economy the only efficient economy defines the frontier. The two points (kb, yb) and (kc, yc), represent observed values of the two ratios in the two periods for some hypothetical economy. Fig 2. Tripartite Decomposition.  y  Yc(kc) D T  Yc  Yc(kb) E  Yb(kc) C  Yb(kb) B  yb A  0 kb kc k By construction, potential outputs for this economy in the two periods are 3b(kb) = yb/eb and 3c(kc) = yc /ec, where eb and ec are the values of the efficiency indexes in the two periods, calculated as in (2) above. Therefore,  EMBED Equation.3   EMBED Equation.3  (3) Multiplying top and bottom by 3b(kc), the potential output-labor ratio at current-period capital intensity using the base-period technology, we obtain  EMBED Equation.3  (4) This identity decomposes the relative change in the output-labor ratio in the two periods into (i) the change in efficiency i.e., the change in the distance from the frontier (the first term on the right); (ii) the technology change i.e., the shift in the frontier (the second term; and (iii) the effect of the change in the capital-labor ratio-i.e., movement along the frontier (the third term). The decomposition in (4) measures technological change by the shift in the frontier in the output direction at the current-period capital-labor ratio-from point C to point D in Figure 2-and it measures the effect of capital accumulation along the base-period frontier-from point B to point C. we can alternatively measure technological change at the base-period capital-labor ratio-from point B to point E in Figure 2-and capital accumulation by movements along the current-period frontier-from point E to point D-by multiplying the top and bottom of (3) by the potential output-labor ratio at base-period capital intensity using the current-period technology, 3c(kb), yielding the decomposition,  EMBED Equation.3  (5) Thus, the decomposition of (discrete) productivity changes (not attributable to efficiency changes) into the technological-change and capital-deepening components is path dependent, and the choice between (4) and (5) is arbitrary. There is no avoiding this arbitrariness, unless technological change is Hicks neutral, in which case the proportional vertical shift in the frontier is independent of the value of the capital-labor ratio. It is this assumption (along with constant returns to scale) that enabled Solow (1957), and the legions of growth accountants who have followed his lead, to unambiguously decompose productivity growth into components attributable to technological change and capital deepening. But without constraining technological change to be Hicks neutral, the proportional (vertical) shift in the frontier varies in unspecified ways. In fact, this arbitrariness is not, per se, attributable to the decomposition itself. It is endemic to the basic task of measuring technological change, as is evident in the necessity of normalizing on one of two technologies in the (Malmquist) productivity index proposed in the pioneering paper of Doughlas W. Caves et al. (1982a). Within this framework it is inferred that technological innovation is a chronic disturber of comparatives and the rules of the game are rapidly changing. The emerging trends have far reaching implications for Africas sustainable development and competitiveness. Global firms are steadily upgrading their technological capacity and performance and progressively raising entry barriers to new entrants. In this process inefficient producers such as African ones, are often squeezed out. Africas competitiveness in its traditional areas of comparative advantage is eroding. This is well documented; The continents share of global export trade fell from 5.9% in 1980 to less than 2% at the end of the 1990s, while sub-Saharan Africas market share at global manufacturing value added (MVA) was halved from 0.69% in 1970 to a low 0.3% in he 1990s. Globalization and liberalization compel companies to compete not only in foreign markets in order to prosper, but also in their own national markets. Africa, therefore, needs to act promptly to counter the possibilities of this double internal and external squeeze. Causes and Impacts of Brain Drain Causes It is acknowledged that a variety of factors shape international mobility of labour. Khadria (2004) in his survey of health professionals in New Delhi reported that the primary motive of out-migration for doctors related to training and career opportunities, compared to nurses that focused on improved income prospects and quality of life. Similar patterns were reported amongst Ghanaian nurses and doctors (Mensah et al. 2005: 28). It is not clear whether these differences relate to the distinctive labour market context of each occupation or whether other factors related to gender and other workforce attributes that influence the motives of migrant health professionals. A widely used framework to analyse health professionals mobility differentiates between push and pull factors. Push factors focus on those pay, working conditions and broader management and governance factors that encourage health professionals to exit their own health systems and leave their country. More comprehensive analyses incorporate factors that push health professionals to shift from rural to urban areas, from public to private sector employment and at times out of the profession altogether as part of the interplay between internal and out-migration. Pull factors direct attention to the factors that encourage health professionals to move to other countries, including shortages and active recruitment from high-income countries. This framework, with its roots in neoclassical economic orthodoxy, focuses on individual migrant behaviour in terms of economic utility maximization; especially wage differentials between source and destination countries. A focus on the individualistic calculations of migrants needs to be complemented by awareness of how structural factors influence migration patterns. The reform of health systems, often as part of programmes of structural adjustment and the liberalization of trade in health services are contributing to the restructuring of labour markets for health professionals. These patterns of restructuring influence mobility indicating that migrants choices are underpinned by the ways in which nation states are integrated into the global economy (Van Eyck 2004: 9-10). The case of Ghana has been used to illustrate how its health professionals have become integrated into a global market. The integration process is indicated by: potential migrants being able to make informed comparisons of wages and conditions across countries; increased private investment in employment agencies to facilitate international recruitment; information on migration processes being widely available; and the existence of feedback effects in terms of upward pressure on wages and conditions in the source country (Mensah et al. 2005: 16-19). Causes of brain drain may be summarized as follows; Push Factors Low and eroding wages and salaries Unsatisfactory living conditions, lack of transport, housing, etc Under-utilization of qualified personnel; lack of satisfactory working conditions; low prospect of professional development Lack of research and other facilities, including support staff; inadequacy of research funds, lack of professional equipment and tools Social unrest, Political conflicts and wars Declining quality of educational system Discrimination in appointments and promotions Lack of freedom Pull Factors Higher wages and income Higher standard of living Better working conditions; job and career opportunities and professional development Substantial funds for research, advanced technology, modern facilities; availability of experienced support staff Political stability Modern educational system; prestige of foreign training Meritocracy, transparency Intellectual freedom Impacts The brain drain crises can also be seen as a process that Africa can theoretically capitalize on. Virtually all of Africas major export sectors are struggling to compete on world markets, yet without any policy effort whatsoever Africa has demonstrated its competitiveness in the training (or production) of doctors and nurses. Such exports allow Africa to bypass the formal trade facilitation challenges (from the world trade organization) that so hamper exports. The mobility of highly skilled labour is associated with a number of positive feed back effects as skilled emigrants continue to affect the economy of their origin country. The main benefits are associated with the remittance of income, the knowledge and skills acquired by returnees, and spillover effects when migration increases the urge to obtain higher education, increasing the stock of education in the source country, with only a proportional of this accumulation of skills lost to out-migration (see mountfold 1997). An illustration of these spill-over effects is the degree in which the educational level of applicants in nursing schools in Ghana has risen to the equivalent entrance level and the number of applicants has also risen sharply, as applicants start to view a nursing qualification as an investment in leaving the country (Mensah et al. 2005:19). We also summarize the impacts of the brain drain as follows: Negative Reduces the already low quantity of skilled manpower available in Africa countries and needed for their development Reduces numbers of dynamic and innovative people, whether entrepreneurs or academics Increases dependence on foreign technical assistance Slows the transfer of technology and widens the gap between African and industrialized countries Negatively affects the continents scientific output Money lost in income tax revenues and in potential contributions to gross domestic product. Positive Contribution of new skills when migrants return Remittances from skilled migrants boosts household welfare Remittances support the balance of payments. Remittances. Remittances are financial flows into households that do not require a quid-pro-quo in economic value (Addison, 2005). They are usually valued as private financial aid that flows directly into the hands of households and the fact that they tend to be counter cyclical suggests that very often they serve as an important source of both income and consumption smoothing strategies for vulnerable poor and non-poor households. Similarly, the literature analyzing the impact of remittance flows shows that these flows are beneficial at all levels the individual, the household, the local community and the national level and indicates that if well managed they can help reduce poverty at these four levels. Buch and Kuckulenz (2002) also report that worker remittances constitute an increasingly important mechanism for the transfer of resources from developed to developing countries is second largest source behind foreign direct investment of external funding for developing countries. Rathar (2003) corroborates the point that migrants may increase remittances in times of economic hardship, especially in low-income countries where their families live at close to subsidence levels may depend significantly on remittances as a source of income. Rather observes that economic downturns may also encourage workers abroad and thereby begin to transfer funds to families left behind. He further argues that while capital flows to rise during favourable economic cycles and fall in bad times, remittances appear to react less violently and show remarkable stability over time. For example, he shows that remittances to developing countries continued to rise steadily, especially during 1998 2001, a period characterized by a decline in private capital flows in the wake of the Asian financial crisis. Thus remittances foreign exchange reserves. They thereby offset some of the output losses or economic shocks that a developing country may suffer from emigration of its highly skilled workers. Negative economic shocks tend to have spill over effects on various sections of an economy. The poor suffer disproportionately from shocks because they generally have limited savings and access to credit. They also rely heavily on public social services, which deteriorate as spending becomes constrained and their limited skills mean higher income shortfalls. In addition to physical damage and income losses, Happe et al. (2003) indicate that these shocks also have indirect effects that can reverberate through an economy, hampering output and investment, upsetting macroeconomic balances, and increasing dept and poverty over a number of years. The type and magnitude of indirect effects will depend on the size and duration of a shock, whether measures were taken in advance in mitigate its impact, the governments policy response and the amount and form a external assistance a country receives. Estimating these effects can be tricky, however because it is difficult both to identify the channels through which they are transmitted and to isolate the magnitude of impact, especially when more than one shock has affected an economy or when an economy is recovering from a prior shock. Through direct and indirect effects, shocks can significantly impede growth. Managing the Drain.What are the options? The brain drain has brought harmful effects to many countries as some of their best talents have emigrated. Some of the consequences have been lower rates of growth, less productive educational investments and poorer health care. There has also been a loss of actual and potential innovators who might have led the way to modernization, as they migrated to educational systems and working environments that better supported their innovative and creative abilities. The conception about the migration of skills is now evolving, putting stronger emphasis on brain gain, which is based on the idea that the expatriate skilled population may be considered as a potential asset instead of a definite loss. There are main options to implement the brain gain either through the return of the expatriates to the country of origin (return option) or through their remote mobilization and association to its development (diaspora option). The return option has been successfully realized in various new industrialized countries (NICs) such as Singapore and the republic of Korea or big developing countries such as France and China (Charum, Meyes eds, 1999). Strong programmes to repatriate many of their skilled nationals abroad have been put in place since 1980. They have created at home the network in which these returnees could effectively find a place and be operational. The experience of the Asian countries like the republic of Korea, Singapore and Taiwan, can provide very useful lessons from which African countries can learn a lot. These nations did set up incentive schemes and mechanisms within a benign socio-economic framework that helped to attract back home quite a lot of their own highly trained expatriate people from the various industrialized countries who helped to fuel the revival of agriculture, commerce, higher education and hi-tech research within these nations and to transform them into the so called newly industrializing countries (MICS). However, the IOM highlights difficulties of facilitating return in relation to African professionals abroad. The challenges highlighted include prolonged job search arising from cumbersome processes, lack of trust in African government amongst the diaspora, and weak government ownership. (IOM cited in WHO/World Bank). The diaspora option is based on network approaches where a network can be defined as a regular set of contacts or similar connections among individual actors or groups (Granoveltes and Suedberg; 1922:9). These networks of highly skilled expatriates are referred to as expatriate knowledge networks. The main feature of the diaspora option is that it tries to set up connections/linkages between highly skilled expatriates and between them and the country of origin. This allows for information and knowledge exchange between expatriates and between them and the country of origin. It allows expatriates the opportunity to transfer their expertise and skills to the country of origin without necessarily returning home permanently. In this way the country of origin has access to the knowledge and expertise of the expatriate, but also the knowledge networks that he/she forms part of in the host country. A crucial element of the diaspora option is therefore an effective system of information to facilitate transfer and exchange of information between network members and between them and their counterparts in the country of origin. Intellectual diaspora members therefore can enable and promote collaboration with African people, institutions and enterprises However diaspora option requires good organizations of networks to ensure communication information exchange and coordinated actions. This is where an interface or coordinating body becomes necessary. The function of such a coordinating body would be to collect, organize and maintain the information needed for the systematic search of partnerships, but also o manage and promote the interests and actions of the multiple entities in a network of this kind. Diaspora option is based on information transfer, and studies have shown that, the next society will be a knowledge society, enabled by the rapidly developing information and communications technology. According to Peter Drucker, it will have highly competitive characteristics and will use knowledge as a key resource. Knowledge has become the most important factor for international competitiveness, the creation of wealth and the improvement of living conditions. The knowledge society will rely heavily on knowledge workers, both traditional professionals like doctors, scientists and engineers, and also "knowledge technologists" such as IT technicians, lab analysts and manufacturing experts, who need a basis of theoretical knowledge acquired through formal education. Innovation, a knowledge-intensive endeavor, requires creative people to put knowledge to work. It also needs a favorable environment. A culture of innovation has indeed become a prerequisite of development in the 21st century. "To understand peoples ability to innovate and their ability to adapt to change", says a recent report from UNESCO, "one has to take into account the social and cultural components of innovation, our environment - including our belief and value systems - shapes the way we view the world around us and determines how we react to ongoing change. Technological change has often-overlooked social effect or consequence; namely, it alters social hierarchies and the power structure of groups within society and in some cases society itself In order to understand peoples ability to innovate and their ability to adapt to change, one has to take into account the social and cultural components of innovation. In the end, these factors are the tools that enable us to create a culture of innovation". The experience of many countries has clearly shown that the loss of high level people cannot be stemmed successfully by restricting mobility, but rather by a favorable political and economic climate together with better work facilities, adequate pay and advancement through merit. This helps retain exceptional talents within the country and utilize them for the countrys benefit. It may also help to bring back some of those who had previously emigrated. Members of the intellectual Diaspora may be induced to participate actively in new, innovative productive ventures in the home country. Emigrants that have accumulated abundant capital, developed novel technologies, and generated successful enterprises may be willing to create new ventures at home on the basis of such resources, often in association with a local partner, if there is true support for these efforts. A promotional mechanism and adequate incentives may help here, such as has happened in Korea, Taiwan and China, where the respective governments have catalyzed and nurtured such initiatives. Several "brain exporting" countries have become aware of these potential benefits, and are attempting to organize their intellectual Diasporas so as to better utilize their high level nationals abroad. This requires a significant effort to survey the Diasporas human resources, create an active network, and develop specific activities and programs. China, Colombia, South Africa (with the motto transform brain drain into brain gain) and to a lesser extent other countries are putting efforts into this. India has also embarked on a similar enterprise. It has begun the process admirably, and should follow up with intensive, creative efforts to connect the network in meaningful endeavors in order to effectively assist the country. Even more can be done by identifying those members of the Diaspora who have acquired exceptional innovative capabilities, utilizing them to spur the home country talents to a more innovative level, and providing easier access, open attitudes and opportunities to bring about meaningful change. Within the intellectual Diaspora, some individuals have developed truly innovative capabilities. We may call them Diaspora innovators having acquired cultural traits and specific knowledge that are essential to innovation in science, technology, education and entrepreneurship."Diaspora innovators" who have studied and worked for extended periods in a modern, open innovative environment have acquired different beliefs and values from those of their original societies. They view the world differently and are able to react to ongoing changes in a more flexible, dynamic and positive manner. Many have acquired good managerial expertise and technological competence, as well as "cultural literacy (the ability to recognize and exploit social, cultural, lifestyle, and ethnic distinctions)" and "a reflexive approach to knowledge and practices" (UNESCO). These core competencies are crucial in creating a culture of innovation. Diaspora innovators indeed embody a specific capital that may be tapped for the purpose of building a culture of innovation in the home country, and thus contribute to developing a knowledge society there. Conclusions and Policy Implications Supply of well-qualified labour is a key ingredient in the generation and diffusion of innovation. Increased human capital only raises labour productivity, but also serves as a driver of technological progress through a significantly positive effect on business sector R&D. The OECD Growth Study estimated that the long run effect on GDP per capita of one additional year of education ranges from 4% o 7% (OECD, 2003g). Governments invest in its citizens human capital through training and education and expect a return on their investment when the individual becomes economically and start paying taxes. Within this perspective migration of highly skilled human resources present a loss to the sending country, because they loss out on returns on the capital they invested in the individual. However, the intellectual diaspora takes a fundamentally different stance to traditional perspectives on the brain drain in that it sees the brain drain not as a loss but a potential gain to the sending country. To realize its full potential, there is need for a democratization and domestication of science and technology in Africa. All key stakeholders must be involved, through national dialogues, in the policy formulation and implementation process, so as to transcend policies that tend to be too narrowly focused on a few number of isolated, ill-equipped and under paid researched and academicians. This will contribute to moving a way from elitist policies, and to defining and strengthening the respective role of public institutions, international partners, universities, NGOs, women organizations, civil society and the private sector. It would also ensure that policies are tailored primarily with a view to meeting specific needs of end-users and clients. ANNEX; Reference Tables Table 1.Emigration of Skilled Africans to Industrialized Countries Time PeriodAverage Annual RateTotal Number1960-19741,80027,0001975-19844,00040,0001985-198912,00060,000Since 199020,000--Source: IOM Table 2 Intellectual Diaspora Network CountryName of NetworkType of NetworkArab CountriesThe Network of Arab Scientists and Technologists Abroad (ASTA)Intell/Scien Diaspora NetworkArgentinaPrograma para la Vinculacion con Cientificos y Tecnicos Argentinos en el Exterior (Program for the Linkage of Argentine Scientists and Technologists Abroad) (PROCITEXT)Developing Intell/Scien Diaspora NetworkAssamTransfer of knowledge and Technology to AssamTOK TEN ProgrammeChinaChinese Scholars Abroad (CHISA) Society of Chinese Bioscientists in America Chinese American Engineers and Scientists Association of Southern California (CESASC)Student/Scholarly Network Local Association of Expatriates Local Association of ExpatriatesColombiaThe Colombian Network of Researchers and Engineers Abroad (Red Caldas)Intell/Scien Diaspora NetworkEl SalvadorConectandonos al Futuro de El Salvador (Connecting to El Salvodor?s FutureDeveloping Intell/Scien Diaspora NetworkFranceSillicon Valley Indian Professionals Association (SIPA) Worldwide Indian Network The international Associaion of Scientists and Engineers and Technologists of Bharatiya Origin Interface for Non Resident Indian Scientists and Technoligists Programme (INRIST)Local Association of Expatriates Intell/Scien Diaspora Network Developing Intell/Scien Diaspora Network Developing Intell/Scien Diaspora Networks IranThe Iranian Scholars Scientific Information NetworkIntell/Scien Diaspora NetworkIrelandThe Irish Research Scientists? Association (IRSA)Intell/Scien Diaspora NetworkJapanJapanese Associate Network (JANET)Student/Scholarly NetworkKenyaAssociation of Kenyans Abroad (AKA)Developing Intell/Scien Diaspora NetworkKoreaKorean Scientists Engineers Association of Sacramento Valley The Global Korean NetworkLocal Association of Expatriates Intell/Scien Diaspora NetworkLatin AmericaAsociation I.attino-americaine de Scientifiques (Latin American Association of Scientists) (ALAS)Intell/Scien Diaspora NetworkLebanonTOKTEN for LebanonTOKTEN ProgrammeMoroccoMoroccan Association of Researchers and Scholars Abroad (MARS)Student/Scholarly NetworkNigeriaAssociation of Nigerians Abroad (A.N.A)Intell/Scien Diaspora NetworkNorwayAssociation of Norwegian StudentsStudent/Scholarly NetworkPakistanReturn of Qualified Expatriate Nationals to PakistanTOKTEN ProgrammePalestineProgramme of Assistance to the Palestine PeopleTOKTEN ProgrammePeruRed Cientifica Peruana (Peruvian Scientific Network)Developing Intell/Scien Diaspora NetworkPhilippinesBrain Gain Network (BGN)Intell/Scien Diaspora NetworkPolandThe Polish Scientists AbroadIntell/Scien Diaspora NetworkRomaniaThe Forum for Science and Reform (FORS)Developing Intell/Scien Diaspora NetworkSouth AfricaThe South African Network of Skills Abroad (SANSA)Intell/Scien Diaspora NetworkThailandThe Reverse Brain Drain Project (RBD) Association of Thai Professionals in America and Canada (ATPAC) The Association of Thai Professionals in Europe (ATPER) The Association of Thai Professionals in Japan (ATPIJ)Developing Intell/Scien. Diaspora Network Intell/Scien Diaspora Network Intell/Scien Diaspora Network Intell/Scien Diaspora Network TunisiaThe Tunisian Scientific Consortium (TSC)Intell/Scien Diaspora NetworkUruguayRed Academica Uruguaya (Uruguayan Academic Network)Developing Intell/Scien Diaspora NetworkVenezuelaIn contact with Venezuela El Programa Talento Venezolano en el Extrior (Program of Venezuelan Talents Abroad) (TALVEN)Developing Intell/Scien Diaspora Networks Table 3 Country of medical school of sub-Saharan African international medical graduates (IMGs) in the US and Canada Country of trainingNumber of African trained IMGs in USNumber of trained IMGs in CanadaNumber of physicians remaining in home country% of total African trained now in US or CanadaNigeria2158123228949South Africa194318452384414Ghana47837121030Ethiopia2579156415Uganda1334272220Kenya931940013Zimbabwe752616946Liberia4787243Other 12 countries*8335129121Total/average533421516558910Source: Hagopiuan et al. (2004: 5) Note:*other 12 countries with at least one graduate in the United States. Table 4 Overseas trained nurses registered per annum in the UK 1998-2005 (Excluding the European Union) Country1998/991999/20002000/012001/022002/032003/042004/05India3096289994183030733690Philippines52105233967235559343382521Australia13351209104613429201326981South Africa59914601086211413681689933Nigeria179208347432509511466West Indies221425261248208397352Zimbabwe52221382473485391311New Zealand527461393443282348289Ghana4074140195251354272Pakistan31344207172140205Zambia154088183133169162US13916814712288141105Mauritius61541625995102Kenya19295015515214699Botswana4-87100399091Canada1961308979528988Nepal214373Swaziland8169China60Malawi1154575576452Others637495Total36215945840315,06412,73014,122211,416Source: NMC (2005). Listed by most numerous country applicants in 2004-05 Bibliography Adams R.H. 2006. Remittances and poverty in Ghana. World bank Working Paper WPS 3838, World Bank, Washington, D.C. 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