

2 | African intellectuals and nationalism¹

THANDIKA MKANDAWIRE

Some years ago I wrote about three generations of post-colonial² intellectuals. It struck me then that the fate of all three generations has been tied to the triumphs and tribulations of the nationalist projects whose problems have set their intellectual agenda over all these years. Elsewhere I have discussed the 'shifting commitments' of the nationalist movement (Mkandawire 1999). Interesting parallels to these shifts in commitments were the developments taking place among the generations of intellectuals. Periodization is always a treacherous exercise, involving as it does an arbitrary imposition of discrete time markers on what is essentially a continuum. One should also note that periodization may not be exactly the same across all countries.³ With this caveat in mind I will use periodization only for heuristic utility and for purposes of exposition.

In recent years, both nationalism and its main projects have fallen on hard times - betrayed by some of its heroes, undercut by international institutions and the forces of globalization, reviled and caricatured by academics, and alien to a whole new generation of Africans born after independence. In intellectual circles, nationalism stands accused of a whole range of crimes and misdeeds. And yet in defiance of its death foretold, nationalism in Africa and elsewhere has displayed a remarkably enduring resonance, although in the eyes of some incongruously and regretfully so. Some of the metamorphoses it has undergone, however, have rendered it far removed from the original version. More specifically, there has been interest

in explaining the fascination of intellectuals with or their adhesion to nationalism. Some have attributed it to self-interest by intellectuals whose path to material or professional ascendancy was blocked by the colonizer. National liberation is thus seen as a way of acceding to positions of power. Other less cynical interpretations attribute it to the skills of intellectuals in articulating in coherent form the aspirations of their countrymen and -women. Still others attribute to the intellectuals a fascination with a fad - nationalism being one of the products of modernization. All this may be

true, but it seems to me that, to the extent that most colonized peoples seek decolonization, it would have been strange if intellectuals had not ~~been part of this aspiration. There is no strong~~ moral case against colonization and there is, after all, a moral agency in many intellectual endeavours.

The protagonists

Let me start by presenting the two protagonists of my narrative. *The nationalists and their agenda* First, the nationalists and nationalism. I will use nationalism as defined by Ernest Gellner as 'primarily the principle which holds that the polity and national unit should hold together' (Gellner 1983: 1). In many ways, the nationalists and their struggles have been occulted partly by their own gross simplification of the nature of the struggle they had been engaged in, partly by the hagiography cultivated by the post-colonial personality cults, and partly by critics who, deeply disappointed by the failures of the post-colonial state, see no virtue in what they once believed in. Because of the failure of the nationalist de-

o.ne bn intel29e

istic alternative constructs that the nationalists had to contend with.⁵ The problem is not so much that the nationalists accepted existing colonial borders, but rather that this acceptance gave individual states carte blanche in terms of what they could do to their citizens within these borders. An Idi Amin could go on a murderous rampage in his own country and still chair the OAU.

In any event, having accepted the colonial borders, they had to deal with the concrete fact of 'nations' consisting of many ethnic groups and nationalities. Africa's social pluralism, its division into more than a thousand ethnic groups, has always been a source of concern in terms of modernization, nation-building, development and governance. At times this pluralism has been made central to the analysis, while at other times it has been entirely banished. But it has, like the sword of Damocles, hung over any other social categorization used in social analysis: class, nation or gender, always threatening to render incoherent any analysis based on these categories. The nationalist movement saw recognition of this pluralism as succumbing to the 'divide and rule' tactics of the colonialist and neo-colonialist forces that were bent on denying African independence, or, when they accepted independence, of emptying it of any meaning by nursing the fissiparous potential that social pluralism always harboured. And so nationalism saw itself as up in arms against imperialism and the retrograde forces of tribalism. In the process something else happened: in combating 'tribalism', nationalism denied ethnic identity and considered any political or, worse, economic claims based on these identities as diabolic as imperialism. The nationalists can be excused for their conflation of tribalism and identity for, in many ways, the forces ranged against nationalism tended to abuse identity. The shock of Katanga, in which Africa's worst enemies - imperialism and racism - championed tribalism against the central government and Patrice Lumumba's martyrdom in the name of the independence and national integrity of the Congo, was so profoundly to affect African nationalism's perception of ethnicity and regional claims that 'Tshombes' and 'Katangas' were seen behind every movement challenging the authority of the central government.

In some countries radicalization of the nationalists, through armed struggles, was to banish ethnicity even farther from any serious political consideration. In those states where 'Marxism' became the leading ideology, class analysis simply rode roughshod over any other social cleavages. They were part of 'false consciousness', 'invented' by the colonialist or the petty bourgeoisie. This may have been the case, but 'false consciousness', while subjective in its origins, can assume an objective historical presence that can only be dismissed at one's peril.

The nationalists were cheered on by the 'modernization school' which considered ethnic identities and social pluralism as 'barriers to development'. If nationalist leaders could somehow bedazzle those mired in their tribal world-view with a more cosmopolitan ('nationalist') outlook, modernization would begin. The leaders could, in a Weberian way, use their 'charisma' to symbolize the new nations. The new myths claimed that nurturing such charisma would gradually replace the retrograde and anti-developmental myths of the tribe. Development presupposed a strong state running a coherent nation. Ethnicity was seen as inimical to both. It weakened the state by the conflicts it engendered, and the multiplicity of its claims simply denied the new countries their 'national image'. This image of the nation was essentially 'European', in its mystified forms: one race, one language, one culture. Alternative images of nation-states, multi-ethnic, multi-cultural or multiracial, were never seriously considered, and if considered had been so tarnished by apartheid's claims as to be of no lasting or sympathetic interest.

Economic development and developmentalism A second key element in the nationalist project and, in a sense, a corollary to the 'nation-building' agenda, was 'economic development'. Such a link between nationalism and development was not, of course, exclusive to Africa. The association between nationalism and development, often understood as involving industrialization, has been so close that Ernest Gellner (1983) suggested that the two were virtually inseparable. Indeed, in the African case independence was associated with the 'right to industrialization'. It is important to stress this point, especially in light of the argument that 'development' as0.Tt

issues. It may be true that development was eventually to be sidetracked from its central objectives or captured to fulfil neo-colonial objectives. It may also be true that internal development and external impositions may have led to undesirable 'development models'. In this case, one can talk of 'imposed' or 'failed' models, but the objective of development in the broad sense of structural change, equity and growth was popular and internally anchored.

Starting with the oil shocks of 1973 and 1979, African economies entered a period of crisis and policy initiative that were to produce two 'lost decades'. Already by the end of the 1970s, with the oil crisis and a hostile external environment, the nationalist developmental project was in crisis. In many cases, import substitution based on the national market had come to a premature halt. For a while greater attention was paid to possible collective responses to the crisis through 'collective self-reliance' and calls for a 'New International Economic Order' (themes reminiscent of the spirit of Bandung two decades earlier). The ideal of regional integration was picked up again and solemnly adopted by the heads of state in the form of the Lagos Plan of Action. Individually, however, every country was under pressure to seek assistance from the Bretton Woods institutions (BWIs) and accept the message of the Berg Report. Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) marked a major defeat of the 'developmentalist project' - a defeat from which Africa has yet to recover.

The nation-building project had also run aground. The few nationalists who remained in power had become tyrants who had squandered all the political legitimacy they previously enjoyed. The soldiers who assumed power through military *coups d'etat* did not have the slightest clue as to what nation-building might require politically. And in any case, many of them had been catapulted into power through the machinations of their erstwhile colonial masters or the new imperialists. And few of the men in uniform had the slightest idea of the role the nationalists had envisaged for the universities. The scabrous figure of Idi Amin visiting Makerere and pronouncing on its prospects was probably the most nightmarish turn of fortunes of the African universities.

This era of adjustment spawned a group that was hailed as the 'New Leaders of Africa': Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, Paul Kagame of Rwanda, Isaias Afwerki of Eritrea and Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia. They were said to be free of the burden of nationalism which had blamed everything on outsiders. They did not hesitate to admit errors and collaborate with others. (For a celebratory account of these leaders, see Connell and Smyth 1998.) The 'nationalism' of the new leaders was often detached from the pan-African ideal and free of its moral imperatives. The new leaders also did not seem

to respect the nationalists' understanding of the inviolability of existing borders, and almost all of them were soon to be embroiled in border conflicts. Furthermore, they seemed more enamoured of being appreciated outside Africa than concerned with building a reputation among their benighted neighbours. To compound matters, 'post-nationalist' leaders have tended to define the nation either in more exclusivistic terms or in adversarial terms. In the former case, the emphasis is on more precise definitions of who are nationals, as in the case of Cote d'Ivoire's President Conan Bedia's insistence on 'Ivoirite' or Zambia's Frederick Chiluba's genealogical definition of a Zambian. The latter shows up in dreams of territorial extension or redefinition of colonial borders, which has been broached by some Tutsi intellectuals. The discreet charm of African nationalism was its vagueness with regard to the nature of its national base and its adherence to a more open-ended pan-Africanism, which did not allow for crossing each other's borders. The new nationalism took a much more divisive turn. Archie Mafeje's observations in this respect are worth citing at length:

... loss of faith in the proto-nationalists of the independence movement has brought forth a new generation of African meta-nationalists who are decidedly anti-imperialist. Having seen the effects of chauvinistic nationalism in situations in which ethnic diversity is the rule, they are hard put to find rationalizations for it by imputing pan-African cultural continuities where none exist, historically and anthropologically. This must be regarded as a very unfortunate relapse on the part of African scholars. It comes at a time when they are called upon to provide *theoretical perspectives* which could help in reconciling African ethnolinguistic diversity with the need for an expansive political and economic hegemony within the continent. (Mafeje 1993: 63-4)

The problem with democratization The relationship between nationalism and democracy was rarely studied, and was always an ambiguous one. It is interesting to note, as Alfred Stepan observes, that two major texts on nationalism, Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities* (1983) and Ernest Gellner's *Nations and Nationalism* (1983), do not discuss the question of democracy. In many cases, nationalist movements used the colonial masters' moral and liberal rhetoric to question the legitimacy not only of foreign rule but also of minority rule.

The questions that immediately arose after independence were: How does one govern societies in which ethnic identities are strong and tend to glide easily into tribalism? And what state structure is appropriate for 'development'? The almost universal response in Africa was one-party rule. In its most idealized form, one-party rule would provide a common

forum through which all groups would be heard. It eventually tripped up on the inherent contradictions of 'one-party participatory democracy'. The great source of incoherence was the failure to reconcile what were obviously socially pluralistic arrangements in terms of class and ethnicity with political and economic arrangements that were monolithic and highly centralized.

Nationalism was fraught with many contradictions that severely taxed intellectuals who sought to understand or resolve them. On the one hand, it had adopted the liberal language of 'one man, one vote' and the individual right to morally discredit colonialism. On the other hand, its major objective was collective self-determination. There was no logical or political reason why, upon attainment of the latter, the nationalist should respect individual freedom. Nationalism was a 'force for collective freedom but a threat to both human solidarity and individual freedom' (Cocks 1991). And so one of the promises to which the nationalists gave short shrift was democracy. No sooner had they come to power than they found reason to discard the liberal democratic institutions that they had fought for and which had eventually brought them to power. The arguments given included the need for strong government and unity, for both 'nation-building' and development, and the cultural inappropriateness of Western institutions to African conditions. In most cases, African leaders received moral and intellectual support for theories of modernization. In the cold war days there was always a foreign ally that found the authoritarian regime compatible with or even necessary to its geopolitical interests.

Intellectuals and their responses Now a word about intellectuals. I will use the terms intellectuals and intelligentsia interchangeably, but with the Russian view of the intelligentsia as the underlying concept.

Independence led to a remarkable expansion in all levels of education. One problem of writing about African intellectuals is that we still lack what Jean Copans calls a 'sociology of African intellectuals'. This absence of a sociology does not, however, logically lead to his conclusion that there is no 'Homo Academicus Africanus'. The 'silence' of the 1980s, both imposed and self-imposed, may have fortified this perception not only of invisibility but also of non-existence. African intellectuals exist and have become much more self-conscious of their condition, and with the wave of democratization are becoming more visible (Madleje Tj0 Tc(e) Tj1.189 Tw0.101 Tc(19913). Tj1.450 Tw0.030 T

and economic 'pull' from abroad, has hit Africa hard and, consequently, a significant proportion of African intellectual contributions emanate from outside the continent.

The age of euphoria? The period up to the late 1970s was when the first African 'professoriate' emerged. During this period the relationship between the state and intellectuals was good. For the first generation of post-colonial intellectuals, this was the era of affirmation of the nationalist project and rejection of imperial intellectual domination and neo-colonial machinations. It was a period in which the African intellectuals' response had two elements: *'d'un part, l'engagement, d'autre part, la prise en charge exclusive, de la construction de l'Afrique'* (Gueye 2001: 231).⁸ The mood of commitment to the new nationalist challenge is captured in the letter written by the poet David Diop just before his departure to Sekou Toure's Guinea to Alioune Diop, the founder of *Presence Africaine*: *'Je pars pour le Guinee au debut de la semaine prochaine en compagnie de Abdou Moumouni, Joseph Ki-Zerbo et quatre autres professeurs africains. Comme je l'ai e'crit, il est des cas que celui qui se pretend intellectuel ne doit plus se contenter de voeux pieux et de declarations d'intention mais donner a ses ecrits un prolongement concret'* (cited by Babacar Sail in the preface to *ibid.*: xiv). Zeneworke Tadesse characterizes this period as one of 'euphoria', not only over the national project but also regarding material comforts (Tadesse 1999). In the words of Abdalla Bujra (1994) this 'was a remarkable period of general unity and agreement about both goals and means'. In his turn, Sadiq Rashid has characterized it 'as a period of mutual tolerance and amicable co-operation between the academic community and the policy-making entities' and of 'mutual accommodation and wilful co-operation' when 'views of academicians were solicited by the latter, while the former readily obliged and often took pride in being associated with the honour of contributing to the crafting of national policies and exposure to the limelight as a result thereof (Rashid 1994).

Development was essentially a statist and elitist project - not in the sense that it deliberately sought inequality and protection of elite interests but rather that it presupposed the pre-eminence of the elites in both its elaboration and implementation. In such a schema, democracy played a secondary role. The real issue, then, was what types of elites controlled the process rather than how they came to power. In more right-wing circles, there was a greater willingness to accept the military because it brought 'law and order' *a la* Samuel Huntington. In radical nationalist circles, the choice was between a 'national' and a 'comprador' bourgeoisie. The ideal movements were national or class-based ones. There was generally

a disdain for mass movements driven by ethnic identities or religious particularisms, as these were considered retrograde and divisive.

We should also remember that this was the era of the cold war, which deeply affected the intellectual climate in Africa. The nationalist choice had been 'positive neutralism'. One consequence is that no full-blooded liberal or communist movements emerged in Africa. Early liberal experiments such as *Transition* magazine at Makerere were severely affected by their association with the CIA through its front organization, the Congress for Cultural Freedom. Vanguard Marxist-Leninist parties emerged only in Egypt, Sudan and South Africa. The favoured political stance was the 'mass party'. Much of the criticism of the mass party was focused on the fact that it lacked clear ideologies, was led by the wrong class, did not allow serious debate, and lacked clear channels for mass participation. There was then little attachment to the 'one party' state itself.

African nationalism always contained some notion of cultural reaffirmation and race liberation. This may never have been adequately theorized, although there can be no doubt that leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah, Leopold Senghor and Cheikh Anta Diop did try in their own way. In reaffirming their own identities, they constantly ran the danger of being accused of being racist essentialists, a charge that Kwame Anthony Appiah has tenaciously articulated (Appiah 1992). Significantly, for African intellectuals the cultural correlate to African nationalism was not national cultures or ethnic identities but pan-African ones: Negritude, African personality, conscientism and so on. During the struggle for independence, nationalism sought historical and cultural anchors - or a usable past - for its sustenance. And in the early years of independence, there was a genuine attempt to find new expressions for what was happening, or expected, in post-colonial Africa. African intellectuals shared this quest. Philosophers sought to elaborate African philosophies or what were disparagingly to be called ethnophilosophies. Historians set out to tell Africa's past, not merely to glorify it and its ancient kings and empires as some were wont to do, but also to establish the humanity of the people's Africa - a humanity denied by Hegel's assertion that Africans had no history other than merely a 'blank darkness' (Miller 1985). It is perhaps not surprising that of all the social science disciplines, it was history which had its own major 'schools' during this era: those of Ibadan, Dakar and Dar es Salaam being among the best known. They were soon to discover, however, that the 'usable' pasts they had sought to construct for the nationalists could be turned into 'abusable pasts' in the hands of an increasingly self-serving political class which could unscrupulously declare that authoritarian rule corresponded to traditional forms of governance or that multi-party democracy was alien to African culture.

The intellectual correlate to the nationalist quest for political and economic independence was intellectual independence. It was an aspiration that was quite broadly shared in African intellectual circles and across the entire ideological spectrum. The independence sought ranged from the simple right to set our own research agenda or identify problems specific to our circumstances to the fundamental question of the basis on which the West had captured the epistemological ground and how it had come to 'know' us or, as an extreme, to 'invent' us. Polemical texts such as Chinweizu's *The West and the Rest of Us* (Chinweizu 1975) were emblematic of this response. This was part of what Valentin Y. Mudimbe called the 'search for the epistemological foundation of an African discourse' (Mudimbe 1988: 164). It ranged from nativism to a reinterpretation of what was universal in the light of the African experience or culture.

Concern over development or, more prosaically, the eradication of poverty, ignorance and disease, the unholy trinity against which the nationalists' swords were drawn, was widely shared in African intellectual circles. One has only to look at the publications of CODESRIA to see this. The name of CODESRIA's flagship publication is *Africa Development*, and for years every research programme had the word development attached to it: 'Technology and Development', 'Education and Development', 'Women and Development', and so on. The developmentalist impulses stimulating the African intellectuals' activities were not confined to social scientists. Some of the most eloquent statements in defence of the quest for material development were made by African writers who railed against cultural nationalism (such as Negritude) that they thought was backward-looking. In an essay entitled 'Negritude is Crying over Spilt Milk', Taban Lilong (cited in Mnthali 1999: 15) said: 'quite a few [false starts] have been made in Africa. We may be failing in doing certain things, but most of us know the direction we are going - straight into the twenty-first century. And to arrive there we are not going to go the way our grand parents would have gone - on foot and by canoe. We shall fly, we shall go by missiles, we shall go with the white man, we shall go with the yellow man. And we shall go by all means.'¹⁰ Criticizing 'cultural nationalism' for its failure to come to grips with technological developments, Abiola Irele, in a paper provocatively entitled 'In Praise of Alienation' (Irele 1992), discusses what technological transformation will entail. He quotes a Yoruba saying: '*Adaniloru k'oni logbon*' (One who causes you injury also teaches you wisdom) and urges Africans to embrace development even if it entails alienation, a position that would drive many a post-modernist to the armoury, given their view that development is a child of the fatally flawed modernist 'enlightenment' project.

One feature of the African intellectual temperament was a populist streak. Many would probably have accepted the characterization of the intelligentsia made by Samir Amin:

The intelligentsia (in the periphery) is not defined by the class origin of its members. It is defined by (i) its anticapitalism; (ii) its openness to the universal dimension of the culture of our times and, by this means, its capacity to situate itself in the world, analyse its contradictions, understand the weak links, and so on; and (iii) its simultaneous capacity to remaining in living and close communion with the popular classes, to share their history and cultural expression. (Amin 1990:136)

The commitment to the under-privileged was accompanied by the view that serious research was good for them. There was a class factor in all this. Pierre van de Berghe observes that in one university in 1960-62, about 61 per cent of the students came from homes in which fathers were either farmers, traders, unskilled workers or artisans; 6.2 per cent from clerical homes; and 22.6 per cent from the homes of semi-professionals. Only 11.2 per cent had fathers who were fully fledged professionals. Paul Tiyambe Zeleza also observes, 'When I attended the University of Malawi in the early 1970s many of my fellow students were from rural and peasant backgrounds, few were from the then minuscule middle class' (Zeleza 2003: 69).

One outstanding feature of the post-independence African state was its reach and its pervasive presence in all walks of life. Its tentacles extended not only to all sectors of the economy but to every nook and cranny of civil society. The ubiquity of the state meant that it was loathed and courted at the same time. This led to insecurity, paranoia, self-censorship, opportunism and even sycophancy among those who sought access to state patronage (Ake 1993; Diouf 1993). With the state looming so large, it is no surprise that this led to statist perceptions of social transformation among African intellectuals by obscuring or overshadowing other social actors - an oversight for which they have been severely criticized (Diouf 1993; Mamdani 1993).

A troubled relationship In order not to exaggerate the sense of harmony during the phase of 'euphoria' and the pre-eminence of nationalism we should recognize the early series of conflict. Already, during the first years of independence, a number of conflicts were arising. This was perhaps inevitable. There was always tension between the intellectual's critical mentality and his/her political affinities, especially among those who insisted on sycophancy and blind faith. In addition, nationalism has

always been double-sided. Many of the virtues of nationalism - a sense of community, patriotism, a sense of a shared historical past - are also its dark side - strong communal feeling can easily turn into xenophobia, and the need for unity can generate

intellectuals argued along these lines and began to distance themselves from the nationalist project. It should be stressed, however, that 'far from representing an abstract repudiation of nationalism as such, Fanon's criticism of bourgeois nationalist ideology is itself delivered from an alternative nationalist standpoint' (Lazarus 1999: 162). Even those who claimed to derive inspiration from Marxism could not entirely do away with nationalism as merely one form of 'false consciousness', with the result that African Marxists were often denigrated by the Western left as, at best, 'radical nationalist'. They often accused the nationalists in power of having 'betrayed' the nationalist cause or being a petty bourgeoisie or comprador class that would never rise to the stature of a 'national bourgeoisie' that might address the 'national question'.

No sooner had the demolition of the short-lived democratic structures been accomplished than a host of theories and justifications for authoritarian rule were advanced. As far as academic freedom was concerned, the sign of things to come was signalled by Kwame Nkrumah in the following words:

We do not intend to sit idly by and see these institutions which are supported by millions of pounds produced out of the sweat and toil of common people continue to be centres of anti-government activities. We want the university college to cease being an alien institution and to take on the character of a Ghanaian University, loyally serving the interest of the nation and the well-being of our people. If reforms do not come from within, we intend to impose them from outside, and no resort to the cry of academic freedom (for academic freedom does not mean irresponsibility) is going to restrain us from seeing that our university is a healthy university devoted to Ghanaian interest. (Cited in Hagan 1993)

The particular circumstances behind Nkrumah's remarks are discussed by George Hagan (*ibid.*) and need not detain us. What is ominous here is that, first, Nkrumah was raising an issue that has dogged the state-university relationship ever since - reconciling utilitarian views about universities and the maintenance of standards and the autonomy of universities. This immediately raised the question about the appropriateness of the university models inherited from the metropolitan countries, including their vaunted autonomy. Seseke Mobutu jumped into the fray:

We need to emancipate the educational system in the Congo from the Western model by going back to the Authenticity while paying due attention to scientific knowledge: I have always thought it inappropriate for us to train our youth as if they were Westerners. It would be more desirable to have an

educational system which shapes the youth according to our requirements. That would make them authentically Congolese. Their ideas, reasoning and actions would be Congolese, and they would see the future in Congolese terms. (Cited in Yeikelo ya Ato and Ntumba 1993:165)

Non-organic intellectuals

Many African academics were willing to submit themselves to the exigencies of nationalism and the new state, which they viewed as 'the custodian of the development process and the university as an institution that must train human resources for development. It then seemed natural to them that the state play a key role in managing the university' (Mamdani 1993). And yet, noting the general consensus among policy-makers and intellectuals on the basic tasks of the new nations, Abdalla Bujra observed:

Unfortunately however it is not clear whether the knowledge produced by these institutions at the time had any direct or indirect contribution to the modest economic growth of most African countries during the 60s. Furthermore and with hindsight, barring the few brilliant exceptions of scholars such as Samir Amin and Ali Mazrui, there were no sparks nor any form of development in the social sciences in African countries during the period. These institutions were largely transmitters of metropolitan social science in their respective countries. (1994: 125)

Few African leaders, however, sought to cultivate an indigenous 'intellectariat' that was, in the Gramscian sense, 'organic'.¹¹ The default position of the African political class was a profound distrust of its country's intellectuals. The kind of rapport that the Indian nationalists sustained with the intellectuals in the post-colonial period, or the links that Jewish intellectuals had with the Israeli state, was rarely seen in Africa.¹² This did not happen on the continent, except perhaps in Algeria, where the intellectuals were organic to the FLN movement and government,¹³ and South Africa, where Afrikaner intellectuals were close to the apartheid regime. One consequence is that the African nationalist post-colonial project had no organic intellectuals and the few that sought to assume that role were reduced to acting as apologists. The African governments tended to reduce their relevance to the provision of 'manpower' resources for development and to indigenize the civil service. And so the first wave of the African intelligentsia was absorbed by the state and parastatal bureaucracies. Once indigenization was achieved, most governments had little motivation to continue support for the African university. The earliest collision between the nationalists and intellectuals occurred over the relationship between excellence and the relevance of African universities. Excellence

was associated with the universal 'Gold Standard' - which in the African case really meant the standards of universities of the erstwhile colonial power. The nationalists sometimes read this as a 'colonial mentality' or 'elitism'. This conflict was in a sense superficial.

Second, African governments relied heavily on foreign mentors, admirers or sycophants for intellectual inspiration or affirmation. In the post-war period there were 'welfare intellectuals' of post-world-war Europe who were organic and subservient to the creation of the welfare state. Some of these spilled over to the colonies as advisers in the 'colonial and welfare' programmes. The more radical were to stay on as advisers to the nationalist governments, setting the stage for the technical assistant syndrome that has done so much damage to Africa and placed a wedge between African intellectuals and the nationalists. Thus Julius Nyerere had a band of foreign 'Fabian socialists' who had easy access to him, in sharp contrast to Tanzanians, who had difficulties in seeing him. Kenneth Kaunda had as a close intellectual associate John Hatch, who was invited to be the first director of the Institute for Humanism. Kwame Nkrumah surrounded himself with pan-Africanists from Africa's diaspora, such as George Padmore and W. E. B. Dubois. In later years there were European and American 'radicals' who were to appear as peripatetic advisers to a whole range of 'progressive' regimes in Africa.

Third, African leaders had a penchant for assuming the role of philosopher-king and reducing intellectual work to the level of incantation of the thought of the leader. Leaders sought to acquire intellectual hegemony by themselves or through advisers, constructing intellectual frameworks that would guide national debates. Nkrumah with his pan-Africanism and Nkrumaism, Nyerere with his Ujamaa, and Kaunda with his humanism are some of the well-known examples. Even characters adamantly committed to mediocrity and obscurantism promulgated ideologies that were supposed to inform their countries' transformation. Mobutu's 'authenticity' was, alas, not the only one. In many cases most of the ideological schemas propounded by African leaders were highly idiosyncratic and often so incoherent as to be beyond the comprehension of the propagators themselves. Adhesion to them was not only difficult but also hazardous for those sycophants who diligently sought to follow the leader through infinite twists and turns as he sought to bridge the cavernous gap between the rhetoric of national goals and the reality of predatory self-aggrandizement. There were even some intellectuals who tried to be exegetes of nationalist texts and wrote fawningly about whoever was in power, but in most cases these were to be hoisted on the petard of their own opportunism. African states were apparently never in great need of any social category other than

that of disposable sycophants, and few African leaders bothered to curry favour with African intellectuals qua intellectuals.

Finally, there was complete misunderstanding of the task that lay ahead. African leaders either overestimated the power and capacity of the 'kingdom' Nkrumah had enjoined them to seek, or underestimated the intellectual and political complexity of the processes of development and nation-building. As Kwame Anthony Appiah notes: 'When the postcolonial rulers inherited the apparatus of colonial rule, they inherited the reins of power; few noticed, at first, they were not attached to a bit' (Appiah 1992: 164). And by all accounts they and the foreign donors continue to underestimate how knowledge-intensive the process has to be.

To make matters worse, few of the debates on development were 'national' in focus, for a number of reasons. First, repression and the self-censorship that went along with it meant that it was safer to talk about such entities as 'centre' and 'periphery' without incurring the wrath of any particular national potentate. Indeed, the anti-imperialism of most governments in Africa meant that such discourse was quite palatable and usable. And to the extent that it blamed outsiders for our failures, it was comforting to the African leaders. Second, a large number of African scholars were 'outsiders' in many ways. They either belonged to racial or ethnic minorities than were systematically excluded from power, or were exiled scholars who could not be expected to influence local politics or insult their host countries. One has only to look at such debates as 'the Kenya Debate' or the 'Dar Debates' to see what I mean. While expatriates debated the efficacy of Ujamaa and vil-lagization and its socialist or petty bourgeois character, Tanzanian scholars largely remained silent, and the few who did participate were preoccupied with a detailed understanding of the social processes in Tanzania, as illustrated by Issa Shivji in his book, *Silent Class Struggles* (1976).¹⁵ Ultimately the ideological denigration of nationalist positions by largely expatriate or refugee scholars undermined an autonomous discussion by a new African left which was still in awe of its expatriate counterparts.¹⁶

Deafening silence or silent struggle?

Ki-Zerbo has characterized the attitude of the time as one proclaiming 'Silence: Development in Progress'. The apparent silence of the intellectuals prompted Issa Shivji (1993) to declare: 'the present crisis has brought in sharp relief the complete passivity and marginality of African intellectuals in the political and social life of our nations'. He added: 'We as intellectuals have distinguished ourselves by our silence, submission and subservience rather than courage and consistency.'

Nationalism and its rhetoric and proclamation were difficult to contend

with. First, in the early years the triumphant nationalists, armed with impeccable testimonies to their personal commitment to the nation (many years in exile or detention), stood on very high moral ground. Indeed, they could, with some justification, claim that they spoke for the nation when they chastised academics for abusing academic freedom by engaging in trivial pursuits that did not address the urgent tasks of nation-building and development. Second, the

There was, of course, no correlation between the silence of academics and the lives of the poor - not in Africa anyway. But such was the force of nationalism and developmentalism that even the prospect that there might indeed be no trade-off between academic freedom and national welfare was discounted.¹⁸

And if one adds to the overall ideological congruence the material comfort and the bright prospects promised by a rapidly expanding civil service and indigenization programmes, one has all the preconditions for a harmonious state-academe relationship. And indeed there was relative peace between the state and academics. African academics were constantly reminded that they were part of the privileged class and 'bourgeoisie of the
ond7220

were also under a cloud of social suspicions, because after all they too were privileged people. And the concept of freedom as an absolute necessity, the central value of an enterprise on modernity, was never invoked in any social framework. (Khan 1993: 290)

The age of delusion

The second period was that of disenchantment and disillusionment when the intellectuals blamed the leaders for 'betraying the nationalist struggle'. It was also a period of self-organization. First, nationalism had lost much of its lustre. Many of the key nationalist leaders had been thrown out of office, killed or sent into exile, sometimes by colleagues in the nationalist struggle. Others clung to power, but age had begun to take its toll on body and soul. During the two decades after independence the mantle of nationalism had been worn by so many dictators that it is difficult to imagine it ever had popular support.

The alienation of African intellectuals deepened in the 1980s. First, the worsening material conditions of the universities simply eroded the basis of the distant but still-cosy relationship between the university and the state. The splendid isolation to which they had been confined was now reduced to squalor as overcrowding and lack of maintenance became pervasive. In response to the more vocal criticisms from academics, the state argued that universities were not doing relevant research, or were undertaking research that was not immediately usable in policy matters. Governments often insisted on eschewing basic research to engage in what was called 'applied research'. In this they were strongly supported by donors, both governmental and non-governmental. In any case, African governments resolved the conflict by simply denying universities excellence and relevance, in which they received the intellectual support of the World Bank, whose 'rates of return' mumbo-jumbo suggested Africa could do without much higher education.

Significantly, this was the period when the brain drain began to assume alarming proportions. Zeleza cites studies which indicate that in the 1980s an average of 23,000 qualified academic staff were emigrating from Africa each year. An estimate in 1995 gave the figure of 50,000 (Zeleza 1998). In his usual provocative manner, Ali Mazrui (1978) tried to give a positive gloss to all this by suggesting that this migration was Africa's revenge, a 'counter-penetration' of the imperial citadel which would subvert Western claims to universalism. Zeleza is more accurate in placing these movements in their proper economic context of labour market processes.

The 1990s also saw the emergence of many movements and social concerns that had been submerged by both the nation-building and the

developmentalist project. Women first pointed out their specific role in development and insisted on the recognition of their contributions. Later the 'Women in Development' agenda shifted towards a more gendered approach to social issues. Feminist scholars attacked African scholarship and intellectual endeavours for their blindness to gender issues and declared that the nationalist projects had been fundamentally patriarchal. Even as they criticized the research agenda in Africa, however, they also had to ensure that the specificities of their own concerns were not submerged by the dominant Western feminism - the old issue of the particular and the universal.

By the time of the arrival of the 'second generation' things had begun to turn sour. They became worse with the end of the post-independence euphoria and consensus, and even worse with the arrival of adjustment, when African governments turned their ears elsewhere. There are a number of ways of reacting to the failure to 'develop' - or to the 'impasse', as it has been dubbed.¹⁹ One response was to question the commitment to and the interpretation of development while another was to question the validity of the objective itself and to say that we never wanted 'development' anyway, that it was a Eurocentric, external imposition. The first reaction was aimed at how 'developmentalism' had become an ideology that was abused by African governments, including those for whom development had never been on the agenda. And so by the 1980s a reaction began to emerge. African intellectuals began to critique 'developmentalism' - not because material progress was undesirable but because as an ideology it absolutized economic growth to the exclusion of other values such as culture and human rights (Ake 1979; Shivji 1980). 'Development' had also become an extremely mystificatory objective. As a team of Congolese scholars observed: 'There is no need to expatiate here on the use of the educational system including universities, by ruling regimes as ideological agencies of system maintenance. It is perfectly clear that the educational system in Zaire helps maintain the existing situation by educating people to work in it. In this process the most anomalous realities are veiled under the concepts of development and underdevelopment' (Yeikelo ya Ato and Ntumba 1993: 166).

At the 1986 CODESRIA General Assembly, a decision was taken to drop 'development' again, not because it had ceased to matter but because it tended to overshadow other growing concerns of the African intellectual community, such as human rights, cultural autonomy, gender equality and national cohesion; because it negated or marginalized other values by posing as the ultimate end of all African endeavours and not as a means to some high goals; and because of the totalizing and repressive hold it had

on politics and its use by both donors and national governments to justify whatever they were doing. It was an objection to the sign 'Silence: Development in Progress' that African leaders sought to hang at the door to our nations and societies. More specifically in the African context, African intellectuals were responding to the terrible uses to which the notion had been put - to suppress human rights, to compel people into undesirable social arrangements, to ride roughshod over people's identities and cultures, and so on. But development in the sense of addressing the material needs of society was squarely on our agenda. Indeed, the urgency of defending 'development' understood as material progress in an inclusive manner was to be highlighted by the 'adjustment' ideology, which reduced economic policy to debt repayment and the satisfaction of an ideologically driven reification of the market, and relegated issues of economic development, democracy and equity to perfunctory rhetoric.

The criticisms of African intellectuals have been focused on examining what went wrong in achieving what they generally view as desirable.²⁰ Their theorizing was still committed to material realities and was firmly tethered to the task of liberating Africa not only from the scourge of foreign domination but also from home-bred tyrants and material deprivation. The majority of African intellectuals may have disagreed on the diagnosis and prescriptions, but they agreed that there was a malaise which afflicted Africa and that knowledge would play an important role in the quest for the cure. The abuse of authority, the obvious positive correlation between authoritarianism and poor economic performance, the demystification of nationalism, the growing political protest and the explosion of conflicts that had hitherto been covered up by repression - all these emboldened African academics to begin to speak out and to insist on both academic freedom and democratization.²¹ The argument was basically one of 'Bringing Development Back In', but this time with a democratic face and a cultural soul. Their criticism of the governments was that they had abandoned the developmental vision that was so central to nationalism.²² Considerable energy had been expended on criticizing structural adjustment programmes, largely for their anti-development bias which favoured stabilization and debt repayment, and their negative effects on democratization, either through weakening of the state to deliver substantive gains to the populace or through their curtailment of democratic space by imposing technocratically driven conditionalities.

Sadiq Rashid (1994) summarizes the experience in this period:

Beginning with the second half of the 1970s and until the present, readiness to solicit and use social science research for policy-making purposes has waned progressively and almost ceased to exist as related to certain areas. Indeed, the amicable relationship and attitude of mutual tolerance

which characterised the interface between academia and bureaucracy in the immediate post-independence era has soured badly and has given way to an increasingly strained relationship of suspicion, mistrust, antagonism and sterile lack of cooperation. A number of reasons have been responsible for this state of affairs. Many governments ... neglected and declined to actively solicit the views and research inputs of national think-tanks, particularly as related to the primary areas of policy setting or policy prescriptions. While a number of social scientists have continued to produce research that was relevant to policy-making purposes, such efforts have often been wilfully ignored. Where research has produced divergent views, it has usually been considered as subversive. Evidence has also indicated that even when solicited by governments, the rate of adoption of recommendations made by social scientists was dismal.

One should also add here that in many ways the research had become progressively even less likely to be usable by existing regimes: Abdalla Bujra's characterization of research in CODESRIA clearly suggests the growing 'unusability' of its research in the eyes of the state.

CODESRIA's literature was dominated by advocacy of equity in the distribution of national resources, the participation of poorer classes in decision-making and at various levels of economic management, and full democratization of the political process. It also carried out consistent attacks on corruption, bad government and state oppression. Given the advocacy of these ideas by CODESRIA and the environment of government policy and decision-making, it is not surprising that CODESRIA has made little impact on state policies. (Bujra 1994)

The commitment to the under-privileged was accompanied by the belief that serious research was good for them. Or as two Zairean scholars stated:

One would expect genuine intellectuals to be patriotic thinkers alive to the demands of the crisis situation. We use the word crisis advisedly, giving it the etymological meaning of 'a decisive turning point, a moment of choice'. From that perspective, intellectuals are people who use such key moments to lay bare the logical roots of the crisis devastating society. In the process they [rip] off the tissue of mystificatory official expiations. The surest way to do this is to examine reality from the perspectives of the underprivileged. For it the privileged who need lies and myths to maintain the status quo. The underprivileged need to use truth to tear down the veil of mystification in their struggle against established order. (Yeikelo ya Ato and Ntumba 1993)

The response of CODESRIA and many individuals to their impotence in

influencing government policies was to turn towards other potential uses of research, such as 'civil society'. Recourse to 'civil society' has, unfortunately, not been without problems. First, the new society was not so discursive as to need serious intellectual input. In purely professional terms, the type of research demanded by NGOs - the main direct consumers of research in civil society - was the consultancy type. This was often premised on the assumption that poor research was good enough for the poor, and as such has often been found to be intellectually unsatisfactory and demeaning. In addition, key elements of civil society relished the tribulations of African intellectuals. In Senegal the independent press spoke mockingly of *intellectuels en panne* (the breakdown of intellectuals), referring to the unceremonial withdrawal of intellectuals from public debates in the country. To add insult to injury, the 'masses' with whom intellectuals attempted to identify have tended to be indifferent to the latter's fate at the hands of the state. In some cases, such as Algeria, they were downright and murderously hostile.²³ The striking image of the African intellectual, then, is his/her marginality and disenfranchisement, a theme captured in much of African writing.²⁴

The decade of extremes: renaissance or resignation?

The third phase was a decade of what Paul Zeleza describes as 'a period of bewildering extremes for Africa' (Zeleza 2003:101). This was most dramatically illustrated by the fact that the two major news items on Africa in 1994 were the liberation of South Africa and the genocide in Rwanda. Africa's 'wave of democratization' rippled uneasily side by side with the more violent one of murderous rebel movements and the collapse of a number of states. Not surprisingly the repertoire of responses by African intellectuals was wide-ranging, including self-criticism, withdrawal, re-engagement in democratic politics, participation in tribalistic politics and joining the guerrillas.

Growing self-criticism There was a great deal of self-criticism among intellectuals. For some this self-criticism called for a re-engagement with society in the light of lessons learned; some were left unfazed by criticism and simply chose to serve whoever was in power or had money; still others withdrew into a kind of self-preoccupation and navel-gazing. The question of the relevance, appropriateness and meaningfulness of what they were producing touched a nerve among African scholars and was 'a source of considerable soul searching among the social science community' (Bujra 1994). African intellectuals have been under enormous pressure to 'account for themselves' (Mafeje 1993).

The first point of self-criticism was the lack of relevance of the institutions they inhabited or ran. Ali Mazrui has argued that:

The African university was conceived primarily as a transmission belt for Western high culture, rather than a workshop for the transfer of Western high skills. African universities became nurseries for a Westernised black intellectual aristocracy. Graduates of Ibadan, Dakar, Makerere acquired Western social tastes more readily than Western organization skills. Those graduates became steeped in Western consumption patterns rather than Western productive techniques. We became wordsmiths - and often despised blacksmiths! (Mazrui 1993:119)

In a similar vein Mahmood Mamdani has articulated this concern thus:

In our single minded pursuit to create centres of learning and research of international standing, we had nurtured researchers and educators who had little capacity to work in surrounding communities but who could move to any institution in any industrialised country and serve any privileged community around the globe with comparative ease. In our failure to contextualise standards and excellence to the needs of our own people, to ground the very process and agenda of learning and research in our conditions, we ended up creating an intelligentsia with little stamina for the very process of development whose vanguard we claimed to be. Like birds who cross oceans when the weather turns adverse, we had little depth and grounding, but maximum reach and mobility. So that, when the going got rough, we got going across borders. (Mamdani 1993:1,795)

As to the question of relevance, my own view is that if our research was 'irrelevant', it was not in terms of the simplistic 'basic' and 'applied' research dichotomy. It was, rather, at two other levels. One was the oppositional stance of most African intellectuals and their unwillingness to be 'usable' by some of the unsavoury regimes that littered the African continent. One simply did not want to be relevant to a Mobutu²⁵ or Banda. 'Relevance' would have been as good a case as any of 'adverse organicity'. Those of a more revolutionary temperament simply did not see any point in advising regimes that were doomed by history or by imminent revolution. In addition, repression bred alienation which, combined with Africans' visceral populism, in turn bred an oppositional stance towards government.

The second related to the quality of intellectual works themselves. Abiola Irele stated:

The moral indolence is mac Tch Tj0 Tc(d) Tj0.064 Tw0.206 Tc(i) Tj0 Tc(y) Tj0.-054 Tc0.206 Tc(i) Tj0 Tc(n)

this country, no coherent intellectual, cultural, moral connection with any scheme of ideas, Western or African. The Israelites in exile singing of their unhappy lot likened the

Another criticism has been of how 'state-centric' African intellectuals have been, i.e. their tendency to view the state as the motivational force of social change and development or to define themselves only in relationship to the state. Although such state-centricism can result in 'entryism', the view that one can influence the state by assuming some functions within it, this need not be the case.²⁷ Mamdani argues that 'one does not need be inside the state to articulate a statist conception' (1993: 254). Writing on Senegalese intellectuals vis-a-vis the state, Aminata Diaw (1993) accuses them of continuing to define themselves only in relation to the state or the political parties opposed to it. They have thus failed to create and manage the instruments of a genuine autonomy that might have ensured a participatory involvement with society commensurate with its stature. The absence of independent publishing or distribution endowed with financial resources from non-governmental sources, and the lack of research outfits with independent financial backing, also contributed to the atomization of the intelligentsia.

It is a fact that whether as duly invited luminaries or as rowdy gate-crashers, the country's intellectuals have been known to invade the political scene as idols or ideologues, technocrats or experts, critics or censors. They have always needed opposition to or collaboration with the regime as reference points and yardsticks for their own performance (Mamdani 1993: 318).

For some this raised serious questions about the integrity of African intellectuals and their relationship with the state. John Ihonvbere and Timothy Shaw (1998) capture this self-criticism:

... one tradition which has emerged in Nigeria is that there has always been a distinction between scholars' performances at the university service and when in government. While in the former, the Nigerian intellectuals have been known for their radical politics and relative forthrightness, honesty and insistence on accountability and justice. As part of the corporatist strategy, however, the government has increasingly picked on militant and vociferous intellectuals and appointed them to important political positions which is where such qualities previously associated with them evaporate. It is therefore appropriate, in some respects, to place the blame for the crisis of the Nigerian society on a section of the intellectual 'class'.

Jibrin Ibrahim raged against Nigerian political scientists for their sycophantic role and for serving as advisers to the military regime in its machinations against the democratization of Nigeria:

Virtually all the antidemocratic measures were devised and implemented by leading members of the political science establishment recruited from

Nigerian universities. For all practical purposes, political scientists played the role of a competent technocracy that was a willing accomplice of the military in subverting the democratic struggles and aspirations of the people. Each blockage of democratic space, each device for defeating democratic forces, and every refusal to keep the schedule of power transfer to elected candidates, was vigorously defended by a coterie of political science professors working for the military dictatorship. (1997:114)

In that they certainly bear responsibility for their stewardship of Babangida's kleptocratic and anti-democratic politics, they have not lived up to the reputation they had previously built of responsible and respected professors of political science. Those professors of political science who designed a transition programme aimed at frustrating the democratic aspirations of Nigerian people, enabling President Ibrahim Babangida to perpetuate his tyrannical and corrupt rule for eight years, have clearly betrayed the deontology that guides their discipline. They have consciously and actively schemed against the evolution of the good state and good governance in their country. They have used their skills to thwart popular demands for a genuine democratic pluralism in the country. The Nigerian people have suffered enormously under the policies that they have formulated and they bear responsibility for that (ibid.: 123).

A recent pillorying of the African intellectual comes from the right:

Throughout Africa's post-colonial history, the opportunism, unflappable sycophancy and trenchant collaboration have allowed tyranny to become entrenched. Doe, Mobutu, Mengistu and other military dictators legitimised their regimes by buying off and co-opting Africa's academics for a pittance ... Do Africa's intellectuals learn? Never... Therefore whatever happens to Africa's intellectuals - whether at the hands of the military despots or their own people - shed no tears for them. Never. (Ayittey 1996: 35)²⁸

And finally, it was suggested that, given their dependence on foreign funding, African intellectual work could not be expected to serve African interests. The late Bade Onimode stated this position most forcefully:

The imperialist funding of social science teaching, research and staff development in the Third World also imposes the same ideological and imperialist orientation and surveillance on peripheral social science scholarship. The issue here is more: 'who pays the piper, calls the tune'. This is how valuable energies of Third World scholars are diverted into the pursuit of false problems, the mystification of the realities of their countries, and the whims and caprices of imperialist foundations and other research grant donors. True enough, the recipient institutions and scholars should be able

to define their own academic priorities, but the problems are that some of the foreign grants are project-tied 'aid' (in reality subsidies for donor countries' exports), while the pro-imperialist orientation of peripheral social scientists ensures that their most irrelevant and obscurantist projects may be funded from abroad in the symbiotic relationship between comprador scholars and imperialist donors. This is how the system of imperialist intermediary in the larger neocolonial economy and society is reproduced in the intellectual sphere. (Onimode 1988: 36)

And still others have decried the distance and oppositional stance of African intellectuals. Archie Mafeje has suggested that the failure to join the political class may have something 'to do with the self-image of African scholars in contrast to their Latin American counterparts, some of whom are part of the "political class"'. Unfortunately he does not elaborate this point, although one can interpret him as saying that if one has strong views about a policy issue, then one should get into the political act.²⁹

There are also those who have criticized African scholarship for its obsession with development. In the more solipsistic renditions of all this, the reality of poverty and underdevelopment are occulted so that the validity of debates on development is determined entirely at the level of discourse, with some boldly proclaiming that in Africa, we have, unbeknownst to ourselves, entered a post-developmental era, where we can now frolic in our myriad identities and hybridity, without the nagging narratives of poverty, ignorance and disease.³⁰ This view was given credence by the prosperity of the advanced capitalist countries. Critics of Western materialism sometimes suggested that economic development would simply bring down doom on Africans. Comfortably ensconced in the material accoutrements of modernity, these preachers seem to suggest that other mortal souls would simply go under were they to attain anything close to their material lifestyles. They would somehow lose the virtues 'of simplicity and conviviality, of noble forms of poverty, of the wisdom of relying on each other, and of the arts of suffering' (Rahnema 1997: x).

Others of a more nihilistic inclination attacked African scholars for having been engaged in the process of nation-building and development. In a number of cases, intellectuals now inveigh against the stultifying nationalist ideology. In extreme cases, they go as far as rejecting the nation-building and development project. In these 'second thoughts' on nationalism, some have sought to co-opt Fanon to the project. But Fanon's critique of 'bourgeois nationalism' is itself delivered from an alternative nationalist standpoint. Fanon's criticism of nationalism never degenerated into the kind of ontological pessimism akin to the Afropessimism of the 1990s.

Others criticized African scholarship for its combativeness and for its 'victimology'. This position was articulated most eloquently by Achilles Mbembe. Mbembe took what Paul Ricoeur has called 'the hermeneutics of suspicion' - the idea that every grand theory and noble sentiment hides a base motive - to extremes. Convinced that the African intellectual project is exclusively one of self-pity, he read any narrative of protest along these lines. His casual mode of allusion to the writings of others allows him the possibility of never describing in enough detail what individual scholars have an

Given the extremely meagre resources and limited political spaces, African intellectuals have been quite productive. It is true that many of their insights were ignored or repackaged and resold as foreign technical assistance. But if the rulers did not pay attention, the blame cannot entirely be placed on the intellectuals. And over the years they have persistently raised questions about national sovereignty, development, the legitimacy of power, equity and democratization. Indeed, in many cases they have been the only ones who have kept all these issues on the agenda. The frustrating experience in Africa is that African governments often paid dearly for advice from foreigners that was common knowledge in African intellectual circles. Just look at the fortune being made by 'good governance' experts.

I also doubt that African intellectuals have been as aloof and detached as is often suggested. The variegated range of dictators that tormented Africa simply left no room for the growth of intellectuals occupying public space.³³ Many spaces that were open (at least theoretically) to intellectuals elsewhere were either erased, infested or occupied, sometimes physically, so that no 'ivory towers' or 'Olympian detachment' or 'self-imposed' marginalization was a meaningful option. Such were the constraints that in most cases the choice was between exile, sullen self-effacement and invisibility, or sycophantic and fawning adulation of power. There were, however, many who heroically chose the option of standing up and fighting, and often ended up in jail or dead.

To be sure, there are cases of resignation and escapism into 'fashionable nonsense' to borrow Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont's characterization of some of the postmodernist writing (Sokal and Bricmont 1998). This posture was given intellectual respectability by the Foucaultian tragic view that we are all slaves of an all-pervasive structure of power which can sustain only a limited range of meaningful action. This view authorized disengagement and moral irresponsibility. Those who chose this path contented themselves with simply condemning the activism that has been quite strong in African intellectual circles. For some this requires a rejection of the validity of social analysis itself. Instead of social and historical analysis, we were now bombarded by new high-concept abstractiveness which often concealed an essentially vacuous social analysis - social poetry riding on a series of untestable hypotheses sustained by a cascade of false paradoxes. If an earlier generation of African scholars was stifled by the obsession with the nationalist project, or by the revolutionary oppositional stance that refused to propose anything before everything else had been challenged, the new generation of African intellectuals runs the risk of operating under the paralysing auspices of 'post-colonial' pessimism, which suggests that, everything being contingent, there are no more grounds for

action. Fortunately these kinds of intellectuals are few, but unfortunately, as often happens, the ideas and moods informed by a passing fad in the 'centre' have found much more zealous adherents in the periphery.

Of those who seem to suggest we have passed through 'development' and entered 'post-developmentalism' without our knowing it, I can say only that their views, when imported into the contexts of extreme material deprivation, sound like a cruel joke. We must remember that for those in developed countries, rejection of material progress and prosperity (most of which is never more than rhetorical) is a matter of choice and discretion. It is more like choosing to fast. In Africa, it would be at best making virtue out of necessity, or like trying to find a material choice, or in

Martin Hopenhayn (2002), 'the form in which forgetting tends to be invoked these days in the wake of its invitation to plasticity and liberty, reeks of the consecration of injustice.' It also distracts attention from many unresolved issues in Africa - poverty, violations of human rights, growing inequality and foreign domination. Fortunately African intellectuals have been too immersed in the real-life situation of the post-colony to allow themselves the self-inflicted angst of postmodernism. Many would probably ask the same questions as Ato Quayson:

What, for instance, is the use of discursive analysis of the language of the IMF's economic recovery packages when this does not address the terrible economic and social disjunctures produced in developing countries by the application of IMF policies and those of other international monetary agencies? ... What, to follow E. San Juan's anguished queries of post-colonial critics, is the use of undermining discourses of power when we never encounter any specific scenario of injustice, domination or actual resistance from which we may gather intimations of the passage through the 'post-colonial' order? What to put it bluntly and even simplistically do academic post-colonial studies contribute to the experience of post-colonialism in the world today? (Cited in Quayson 2000: 8)

Taken seriously, the nihilistic posture informing this criticism would have undermined the strong humanistic concerns that have sustained African scholarship all these years. I am, however, consoled by the knowledge that most African social scientists still possess enough sense to see that poverty is far from being an endangered species and still roams Africa unchallenged by the vast human knowledge, social skills and experience of its populations. I am inclined to share Abiola Irele's impassioned call for the revitalization of our intellectual endeavours and a recommitment to what he calls the 'modernity project':

But it is time to shove off dejection and all the other disabling emotions, and begin to work diligently to put our house in order. We must look around us and take to heart the sneers, the put-downs, the insults, the condescension and the contempt of our detractors, respond to them as spurs to renewed commitment to the welfare of our continent. The signs are there that the tide may be turning for the better in Africa. Despite the vicissitudes it has gone through, the partial successes and the frustrations it has known, the democratisation movement that has been making its way through the continent since the early nineties attests to a new impulse for reform. This suggests a groundswell moving Africa towards a new internal order. It is essential that this new order be marked by a reprise of the modernity project. (Irele 2000)

To conclude, the problem with the relationship between intellectuals and the state was not so much that of corruption or aloofness or even irrelevance but of an unrequited love for the 'Prince' - the state - which African intellectuals generally felt constituted the major instrument for development and nation-building. Much of the distance between the African intellectual and the politician did not come about by choice. The instinctive position of African intellectuals was in a sense to be 'organic' to the national movement and to submit their intellectual values to the nationalist project. If they were naive at all, it was in the belief that they would directly or even individually influence policy without any mediation or support from social movements.

Protest and self-organization We noted that for much of the post-independence period, African intellectuals had acquiesced in the nationalist project and had in many cases failed to insist on the importance of intellectual freedom. By the end of the 1980s, African scholars' organizations began to speak openly against the suppression of academic freedom - a process that culminated in the Kampala Declaration on Academic Freedom that was adopted ayrd ayyf

of intellectual life was thus due not to the munificence of African states but to the contracts from foreign governments and NGOs (Bangura 1994; Mkandawire 1998). African governments could access their own intellectuals only through donor-contracted reports. This should not be interpreted as suggesting that African intellectuals were close to the foreign 'prince'. Donors themselves usually exhibited ill-disguised contempt for local intellectuals, whom they saw as either mercenary or as people who criticized them but offered no alternatives, or were part of the rent-seeking or clientelist cliques that had benefited from past policies, which meant that their opposition to 'reform' was self-serving. With such a view of local capacities, donors were to embark on the unending task of 'capacity-building' aimed at producing a cadre well versed in whatever donors thought was necessary knowledge.

African intellectuals are today much freer than they have ever been since independence. The sullen silence of the 1980s was broken by the emergence of the movement for democratization. This also marked a growing self-consciousness of intellectuals as a social group, with rights and responsibilities. Academics themselves had been quick to clamour for academic freedom.³⁷ Once again, we see African intellectuals adopting a self-consciously public position on national issues. But they work under incredible conditions. They are probably much less 'organic' to the current project of reintegrating African economies through structural adjustment, dependent as it is on global technocrats. African inte3 Tc(rTj0 Tc(d) Tj0.726 c(selfTj1.373 Tw0.584 Oc(donor-190 Tc

they saw, or prevented them from seeing certain things. The result could easily be frustration, or the narcissism and self-defensiveness that come with nostalgia and in the sadder cases of self-deprecation. This sociological character of African intellectuals - exile, racial and ethnic minority - could also lead to tone-deafness to various localisms, including nationalism. In addition, the privileging of the intellectual expressions of the diaspora could mute the voices in the periphery and render them neutral by simply positing them as part of the hybridity. We still need to know more about the implications of the cartography.³⁸

The new agenda?

Bringing democracy back in By the mid-1980s, there was a trend towards a greater focus on the problems of democratization. A number of factors accounted for this. The first was the deepening economic crisis and the imposition by the BWIs of an adjustment process which was not only inequitable but that was widely perceived as non-developmental. The model of adjustment was also politically associated with authoritarian rule. A second fact was the realization in African intellectual circles that what was wrong with African economies was not 'market distortions', as the folks from Washington tended to argue, but state-society relations or 'governance'.³⁹ The World Bank's problem with the African-inspired debate on governance was that it did not leave much room for the bank. Its insistence on the importance of local initiatives, political accountability to citizens and the reconciliation of African traditions and institutions with 'modern' traditions and institutions are not exactly the types of issue the World Bank can relate to in a quantifiable and practical manner. It is significant that the World Bank's concern with governance was influenced by African scholars. From this concern with state-society relations and resistance to foreign domination arose the interest in democratization - a concern signalled by the activities of two of the major social science networks in Africa: CODESRIA and the Third World Forum. Both embarked on research or instituted social movements for democracy, which suggested that the forces for democratization would be internal. It is significant that this upsurge of interest in democratization took place at the time when Africanist research was mired in an Afropessimism that essentially saw no internal sources of change within Africa.

Development once again Through all the twists and turns, development still remains on the agenda and is part of African debates on democracy. Anyang' Nyong'o's defence of democracy (1988) was on the grounds that it would lead to better governance and more development. Even those who

objected to this instrumentalization of democracy admitted that it would be worthwhile exploring the possibilities of a process in which democracy and development were not only synergetic but also mutually constitutive. Increasingly, there were attempts to explore 'democratic developmental states', especially in the light of the failure of new democracies to escape the deflationary vice of the BWIs (Ake 1996; Mkandawire 1995). There were, of course, those who rejected the whole idea of 'development'. Much of this rejection was informed by postmodernism and has reached Africa largely via African scholars in the diaspora and South African (mostly white) scholars. Francophone African scholars have also played a leading role here, partly because economics has rarely dominated the discourse on development in their circles, as it has in anglophone intellectual circles. Some elements of the ecological critique have also entered African discourse, questioning the replicability of the Western model, especially with respect to environmental sustainability. This has not had much resonance in African intellectual circles, however, in which concerns with intra-temporal distribution issues (North-South issues) overwhelmingly exceed the inter-temporal, inter-generational concerns that dominate Western discourse on the environment.

Nation-building once again One of the paradoxes of recent years is that theories of dependence lost their intellectual supremacy at precisely the time when African economies were entering a phase of greater foreign control than ever before since their independence. 'Conditionalities' basically dictated African economic policy; the debt noose was being drawn tighter for economies whose growth was now anaemic. There were more 'experts' in Africa than there had ever been under colonial rule. 'Anti-imperialism' had lost its purchase, especially among the 'third generation', who had experienced Africa's decline under African rule. They were simply not going to buy the 'foreign domination' argument. And in any case the heroic epoch was too far in the past to have any resonance among this generation. Furthermore, the obviously egregious mismanagement of national affairs ~~in the family of nations~~ has considerable room for domestic reform, even in the face of a hostile external environment.

reasons for revisiting these issues need not be the same as those of the 'founding fathers'.

In more recent years, there has been a call for an 'African renaissance'. As Mamdani has argued, there can be no renaissance without an intelligentsia to drive it. Such an African renaissance requires an Africa-focused intelligentsia. This will also demand a major rethink by both the political actors and the intelligentsia of the relationship between them.

Conclusion

The nationalist modernity project is inherently fraught with dilemmas that require careful and constant attention. The critical intellectual task is not to simply state this rather banal fact but to engage society in acknowledging and addressing (without necessarily eliminating) such dilemmas. The dilemmas include those of individual or local rights and national sovereignty; the conflict between the particularism of nationalism and the universalism of its aspirations; the thin line between unity and uniformity; and cultural homogeneity and provincialism; the trade-offs in the development process. Every case of nation-building has had to address these questions.

We have a moral obligation to ourselves and to humanity to put our house in order and to think ourselves out of our current predicament. The construction of a democratic, developmental and socially inclusive social order has become a moral imperative and a question of survival in Africa. This is a project that will tax our collective moral, material and physical strength.

Like all communities of intellectuals, African intellectuals will not always be able to resist the contingent and transitory call of passing fads, material detractions and mystification. I believe that the African intellectual must continue to be, in the words of Wole Soyinka, an 'author of the language that tries to speak truth to power'. One can only hope that this time around both state and society will realize that an unfettered intellectual class is an emancipatory force that can be put to good use.

Notes

1 This is a significantly revised version of a lecture I gave in Australia. A day before the death of Julius Nyerere I received a reminder from the organizers of this conference to submit the topic of my keynote address. I settled on this topic because I thought I could use the sad occasion of the death of this extremely decent African nationalist to reflect on the turbulent link between African nationalism, African intellectuals and the academic community. Nyerere was also interesting as a prop to my lecture because he was one of the few African nationalists who straddled the two worlds of thought and action,

14 Claude Ake's observation on the importance of knowledge in the development process is apt: 'Development requires changes on a revolutionary scale; it is in every sense a heroic enterprise calling for consummate confidence. It is not for people who do not know who they are and where they are coming from, for such people are unlikely to know where they are going' (1996:16).

15 One reason could have been fear of voicing criticism, but it would also have been due to the sense of helplessness as one's village was being experimented upon and one's intellectual mentors cheered the exercise or criticized it for not being radical enough and failing to 'capture' the peasantry. What was one to say when, after all the disruption and the forced villagization, someone argued that the peasants were still 'uncaptured'? I do not deny here that some indigenous 'modernizers' with Stalinist inclinations may have seen all this as the price to pay for the process. Rather, I am suggesting that for many Tanzanian scholars the process was too close to home for comfort.

16 One remarkable fact is that while African scholars distanced themselves from the state and were encouraged to do so by their foreign colleagues or mentors, quite a number of the latter were themselves advisers or counsellors to neo-colonial powers. While deploring nationalism in African scholarship, these scholars were Gaullist in their perception of the world. To be sure, the Africanists were confronted with an intellectual incomprehension on the part of the state officials dealing with Africa, who apparently had no use for Africanist studies. Jean Copans' account of the role of the Africanists who accepted the role of *'conseiller de prince'* is quite illuminating in this sense, although he conveniently avoids examining the implications of this position. To be sure, there was some soul-searching, especially in the United States, where the CIA was quite active and had surreptitiously funded cultural and intellectual activities in Africa - the case of *Transition* being the most notorious.

17 Jibril Ibrahim was to cause an outcry when he suggested that African intellectual 'icons' had not shown much enthusiasm for democracy. As Archie Mafeje clearly suggested, the issue was not 'democracy' per se but the capacity of liberal democracy to deliver on such issues as distribution and equity (Mafeje 1993).

18 The strength of the position comes out sharply in the responses to my claim that democracy has intrinsic value and that support for it need not be confined to its instrumentalist facilitation of economic development, as Peter Anyang Nyong'o had suggested.

19 There has been a considerable amount of soul-searching on the 'impasse' of development. Much of this is written from the perspectives of the 'development industry' and aid establishment abroad. African thinking and intellectual moods are rarely considered in such debates. For some of the interesting readings on this see Booth (1994), Munck (1986) and Schuurman (1993). Some have, of course, gone so far as to declare development studies 'dead', and have proceeded to a 'post-development' phase. See for instance Rahnema (1997) and Sachs (1992).

20 This they have done by looking for both internal and external reasons for the failure. Contrary to the caricature of the African discourse, it has never

been exclusively internalist in its critique. African writers began complaining about problems of corruption, waste and mismanagement long before it became fashionable in the donor community to talk about these things.

21 The single most important manifestation was the symposium on Academic Freedom organized by CODESRIA in Kampala in 1990. One important outcome of the conference was the 'Kampala Declaration on Intellectual Freedom and Social Responsibility'.

22 Claude Ake, who had earlier accused African leaders of 'developmentalism', ended up arguing that 'the problem is not so much that development has failed as that it was never really on the agenda' (Ake 1996). It was a position Archie Mafeje (1997) believes can be challenged for being an 'overstatement'.

23 See especially el Kenz's account (1996) of the 'baffling' and devastating realization by Algerian intellectuals that not only were they not organic to the state but that the people they had considered friends had now turned into mortal enemies; and of the cultural hegemonic struggles into which intellectuals have been often violently drawn.

24 See Mnthali (1988). He concludes his article by noting that the characters to whom various African writers assign the role of intellectuals 'have common traits which have made their role in Africa somewhat marginal'. He then adds, 'Perhaps this marginality has contributed to Africa's crisis. Perhaps' (p. 31).

25 V. V. Mudimbe is reported to have fled Zaire after having refused a seat on the central committee of Mobutu's ruling party.

26 It is interesting to compare this with how the Japanese have 'read' the West. As an example, among Japanese economists Marx, Schumpeter, List and Keynes were viewed as outstanding theoreticians of change in the West. The Japanese read these texts with a decidedly 'nationalist' twist. If concentration of capital were crucial to imperialism, then concentration of capital in Japan would be crucial both for blocking the colonization of Japan and eventually for its own imperial ambitions. If capitalism could generate class conflict, then 'nationalism' had to be used to undermine class conflict. These texts appeared to make it clear that national competitiveness could not be assured by free markets. These might lead to an efficient but colonized nation, which could not resist the thrust of the monopolies from abroad. One consequence of this was that Japanese industrial policy encouraged the Zaibatsus as a way not only of organizing industrial activities but also as a means of enhancing Japanese competitiveness. If competition could be both destructive and constructive, it was necessary to reduce the former qualities and encourage the latter by avoiding 'excessive competition' (Gao 1997). Of course this reading also suggested the intimate relationship between intellectuals and the Establishment.

27 In a rather enigmatic comment Archie Mafeje seemed puzzled by Claude Ake's not seeking some post in intra-African organizations, given his strong views on the Lagos Plan of Action.

28 Ayittey has been closely associated with some of the most rabidly right-wing think tanks in the United States and is likely to be hostile to African intellectuals for their largely progressive and humanistic positions.

29 Mafeje makes this comment in a review of Claude Ake's book (Ake

1996). He states: 'Claude Ake narrates the unfolding drama, blackmail, capitulation, and the ultimate defeat of the impecunious Africans with such intensity, unrelenting persistence, and dark anger that one wonders why he never made a bid for high office in the relevant intra-African political structures. Has the failure anything to do with the self-image of African scholars in contrast to their Latin American counterparts, some of whom are part of the "political class"?' (Mafeje 1997: 82).

30 This is not idle speculation. One observer of a CODESRIA symposium on globalization noted: 'It was also surprising that the symposium did not engage some of the most pressing problems facing the continent, such as the numerous wars, the alarming increase in poverty, ethnic conflicts, the problems posed by Islamic fundamentalism, the continued pervasiveness of undemocratic regimes, the growing prevalence of homophobia and xenophobia. Questions about relevance and utility of Africa social science can only properly be answered if the real problems confronting Africa become focal points of analysis.' One shares Takaki's concerns that a political economy of development will be sacrificed to 'scholarly representations of other scholarly representations of original representations - feasts of intellectual delights detached from the reality of poverty, racism, greed, theft, chicanery and exploitation'. R. Takaki (1995) 'Culture Wars in the United States: Closing Reflections on the Century of the Colour Line', in J. N. Pieterse and B. Pakesh (eds), *The Decolonisation of the Imagination: Culture, Knowledge and Power*, London: Zed Books.

31 Mbembe's analysis was too choked with rancour to achieve its lofty ambitions, whatever these were.

32 Mafeje attributes their lack of inhibition or reserve to the fact that they were part of the dominant African elite. There, 'at the beginning they felt no need to be submissive or subservient to anybody'. Such a state did not, of course, last long.

33 For problems of academic freedom in Africa see Africa Watch (1991), CODESRIA (1996), Diouf and Mamdani (1983) and Mkandawire (1996).

34 Or as Dennis Ekpo forcefully argued (1995), 'nothing stops the African from viewing the celebrated postmodern condition ... as nothing but the hypocritical self-flattering cry of overfed and spoilt children of hypercapitalism. So what has hungry Africa got to do with the post-material disgust... of the bored and the overfed?'

35 For a good review of the literature, see Buijtenhuijs and Thiriot (1995).

36 Francis Njubi, a keen observer of Africa's intellectual diaspora, has written trenchantly on this new breed of 'intellectual compradors' (2002): 'Members of the comprador class use their national origins, colour and education to serve as spokesmen and intellectual henchmen for organizations such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. They serve as the sweetener that makes it easier for African countries to swallow the bitter pills of illegitimate debt and structural adjustment. Although some of them work directly for the international financial institutions, most continue to teach at colleges and universities in the West while serving as "consultants" to international financial institutions. They receive lucrative contracts for research and development

that serve a dual purpose: putting a human (black) face on international capital while forcing client states to accept draconian conditions that amount to debt peonage.'

37 See for instance, the papers in Diouf and Mamdani (1983), and especially the Kampala Declaration on Academic Freedom, which is reproduced as an appendix in the book.

38 Work is beginning on Africa's intellectual diaspora but much of it remains rather tentative. See, for instance, Gueye (2001), Njubi (2002) and Zeleza (1998).

39 Among the Africans at the World Bank were Mamadou Dia and Dunstan Wai. Among contributors to the background documents were Claude Ake, George Ayittey, Makhtar Diouf and Balghia Badri. The World Bank acknowledged their contributions thus: 'The World Bank's Long-Term Perspectives Study (LTPS) on Sub-Saharan Africa introduced an additional dimension when it explicitly considered noneconomic issues in its analysis of the continent's present crisis and prospects for growth into the next century. Consideration of these aspects was very much a result of the collaborative approach adopted early in the preparation of this report. In the process, it became clear that any assessment of the region's performance in the past and directions for the future would have to be informed by issues that cut across various disciplines to include history, culture, politics, and the very ethos of Africa. By listening to the report's African and other collaborators, it was evident that a report with a scope such as that of the LTPS could no longer evade these issues. These collaborators greatly strengthened that ability of the LTPS to address, if not authoritatively, at least in a well-informed manner, the deep-seated concerns that ultimately shape and direct the course of economic growth and development. The ten papers presented in this third volume of the LTPS Background Papers contain some of those invaluable contributions' (Ahmed 1990:1).

References

- Africa Watch (1991) *Academic Freedom and Human Rights Abuses in Africa*, New York: Human Rights Watch
- Ahmed, Z. (1990) 'Introduction', in *The Long-term Perspective Study of Sub-Saharan Africa: Institutional and Sociopolitical Issues*, Washington, DC: World Bank
- Ake, C. (1979) 'Ideology and Objective Conditions', in J. Barkan and J. Okumu (eds), *Politics and Public Policy in Kenya and Tanzania*, Nairobi: Heinemann, pp.117-28
- (1993) 'Academic Freedom and Material Base', in M. Diouf and M. Mamdani (eds), *Academic Freedom in Africa*, Dakar: CODESRIA
- (1996) *Democracy and Development in Africa*, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution
- Amin, S. (1990) 'The Social Movements in the Periphery: An End to National Liberation?', in S. Amin, G. Arrighi and E. Wallerstein (eds), *Transforming Revolution: Social Movement and the World-System*, New York: Monthly Review Press

- Anderson, B. (1983) *Imagined Communities*, London: Verso
- Anyang' Nyongo, P. (1988) 'Political Instability and the Prospects for Democracy in Africa', *Africa Development*, VIII: 1
- Appiah, K. A. (1992) *My Father's House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture*, London: Methuen
- Ayittey, G. (1996) 'No Tears for Africa's Intellectuals', *New African*
- Bangura, Y. (1994) 'Intellectuals, Economic Reform and Social Change: Constraints and Opportunities in the Formations of a Nigerian Technocracy', Dakar: CODESRIA
- Booth, D. (ed.) (1994) *Rethinking Social Development: Theory, Research and Practice*, London: Longman
- Buijtenhuijs, R. and C. Thiriot (1995) *Democratisation in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1992-1995: A Review of the Literature*, Leiden: African Studies Centre
- Bujra, A. (1994) 'Whither Social Institutions in Africa? A Prognosis', *Africa Development*, XIX(i): 119-66
- Chinweizu, O. J. (1975) *The West and the Rest of Us: White Predators, Black Slavers and the African Elite*, New York: Vintage Books
- Cocks, J. (1991) 'Passion and Paradox: Intellectuals Confront the National Question', Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
- CODESRIA (ed.) (1996) *The State of Academic Freedom in Africa*, Dakar: CODESRIA
- Connell, D. and F. Smyth (1998) 'Africa's New Bloc', *Foreign Affairs*, March/April, pp. 80-94
- Davidson, B. (1992) 'The Black Man's Burden', London: James Currey
- Diamond, J. (1997) *Guns, Germs, and Steel*, New York: Norton
- Diaw, A. (1993) 'Democracy of the Literati', in M. Diop (ed.), *Senegal: Essays in Statecraft*, Dakar: CODESRIA, pp. 221-68
- Diouf, M. (1993) 'Intellectuals and the State in Senegal: The Search for a

- Hansen, E. (1976) *Frantz Fanon: Social and Political Thought*, Columbus, OH: Ohio State University
- Honenhayn, M. (2002) *No Apocalypse, No Integration: Modernism and Postmodernism in Latin America*, Durham, NC: Duke University Press
- Hountondji, P. (1992) 'Recapturing', in E. Mudimbe (ed.), *The Surreptitious Speech: Presence Africaine and the Politics of Otherness 1947-1987*, University of Chicago Press, pp. 238-42
- Ibrahim, J. (1997) 'Political Scientists and the Subversion of Democracy in Nigeria', in G. Nzongola-Ntalaja and M. C. Lee (eds), *The State and Democracy in Africa*, Harare: AAPS Books, pp. 114-24
- Ihonybere, J. and T. Shaw (1998) *Illusions of Power: Nigeria in Transition*, Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press
- Irele, A. (1992) 'In Praise of Alienation', in V. Y. Mudimbe (ed.), *The Surreptitious Speech: Presence Africaine and the Politics of Otherness - 1947-1987*, University of Chicago Press, pp. 201-24
- (2000) 'The Political Kingdom: Toward Reconstruction in Africa', <www.africahome.com/community/africanist/categories/scholar/ecopolitics/EpEAAZaupAZdEYAxAwf.shtml>
- Khan, A. (1993) 'Algerian Intellectuals: Between Identity and Modernity', in M. Diouf and M. Mamdani (eds), *Academic Freedom in Africa*, Dakar: CODESRIA
- Lazarus, N. (1999) 'Disavowing Decolonisation: Fanon, Nationalism, and the Question of Representation in Postcolonial Theory', in A. Alessandrini (ed.), *Frantz Fanon: Critical Perspectives*, London: Routledge, pp. 161-94
- Mafeje, A. (1993) 'On "Icons" and African Perspectives on Democracy: A Commentary on Jibrin Ibrahim's Views', *CODESRIA Bulletin*, 2:18-21
- (1997) 'Democracy and Development: A Tribute to Claude Ake', *African Journal of International Affairs*, 1(1): 78-92
- Mamdani, M. (ed.) (1993) *The Intelligentsia, the State and Social Movements in Africa*, Dakar: CODESRIA
- (1999) 'There Can be no African Renaissance without an African-focused Intelligentsia', in M. W. Makgoba (ed.), *African Renaissance: The New Struggle*, Cape Town: Mafube Publishing
- Mazrui, A. (1978) *Political Values and Educated Class in Africa*, London: Heinemann
- (1993) 'The Impact of Global Changes on Academic Freedom in Africa: a Preliminary Assessment', in M. Diouf and M. Mamdani (eds), *Academic Freedom in Africa*, Dakar: CODESRIA
- Miller, C. (1985) *Blank Darkness: Africanist Discourse in French*, University of Chicago Press
- Mkandawire, T. (1995) 'Beyond Crisis: Towards Democratic Development States', 8th CODESRIA General Assembly held at Dakar, 26 June-2 July
- (1996) 'The State, Human Rights and Academic Freedom', in John D. Turner (ed.), *The State and the School: An International Perspective*, London: Palmer Press

- (1998) 'The Social Sciences in Africa: Breaking Local Barriers and Negotiating International Presence, the M. K. O. Abiola Distinguished Lecture Presented to the 1996 African Studies Association Annual Meeting', *African Studies Review*, 40(2): 15-36
- (1999) 'Shifting Commitments and National Cohesion in African Countries', in L. Wohlegemuth, S. Gibson, S. Klasen and E. Rothchild (eds), *Common Security and Civil Society in Africa*, Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, pp. 14-41
- Mnthali, F. (1988) 'Change and the Intelligentsia in African Literature: A Study in Marginality', *Africa Development*, XHI(3): 5-32
- (1999) 'The Challenge of Culture in the Twenty-First Century', Inaugural Lecture, University of Botswana, Gaborone
- Mudimbe, V. Y. 1988. *The Invention of Africa: Gnosis, Philosophy, and the Order of Knowledge*, London: James Currey
- Munck, R. (1986) *The Difficult Dialogue: Marxism and Nationalism*, London
- New York Review of Books* (2001) 'The Lure of Syracuse', XLVIII(14)
- Njubi, F. N. (2002) 'Migration, Identity and the Politics of African Intellectuals in the North', 10th CODESRIA General Assembly held at Kampala, Uganda
- Onimode, B. (1988) *A Political Economy of the African Crisis*, London: Zed Books
- Onwanibe, R. C. (1983) *A Critique of Revolutionary Humanism: Frantz Fanon*, St Louis, MO: W. H. Green
- Prah, K. K. (1998) *Beyond the Colour Line: Pan-Africanist Disputations: Selected Sketches, Letters, Papers, and Reviews*, Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press
- Quayson, A. (2000) *Postcolonialism: Theory, Practice and Process*, Oxford: Polity Press.
- Rahnema, M. (1997) 'Introduction', in M. Rahnema and V. Bawtree (eds), *The Post-development Reader*, London: Zed Books
- Rahnema, M. and V. Bawtree (eds) (1997) *The Post-development Reader*, London: Zed Books
- Rashid, S. (1994) 'Social Sciences and Policy-making in Africa: A Critical Review', *Africa Development*, XIX(1): 91-118
- Sachs, W. (ed.) (1992) *The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge and Power*, London: Zed Books
- Sakaki, R., Glturws92 Tw-0uide,
Decolonisation of the Imagination: Culture, Knowledge and Power, London: Zed Books
- Sand, S. (1997) 'Between the Word and the Land: Intellectuals and the State in Israel', in J. Jennings and A. Kemp-Welch (eds), *Intellectuals in Politics: From the Dreyfus Affair to Salman Rushdie*, London: Routledge
- Schuurman, F. (ed.) (1993) *Beyond the Impasse: New Directions in Development Theory*, London: Zed Books
- Shivji, I. (1976) *Class Struggles in Tanzania*, London: Heinemann
- (1980) 'The State in the Dominated Social Formations of Africa: Some Theoretical Issues', *International Social Science Journal*, XXXII(4): 730-42

- (1993) *Intellectuals at the Hill: Essays and Talks 1969-1993*, Dar es Salaam: Dar es Salaam University Press
- Sokal, A. and J. Brichmont (1998) *Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectual Abuse of Science*, New York: Picador
- Sylla, L. (1982) 'Black Africa: A Generation after Independence', *Daedalus: Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences*, III(2): 11-28
- Tadesse, Z. (1999) 'From Euphoria to Gloom? Navigating the Murky Waters of African Academic Institutes', in W. Martin and M. West (eds), *Out of One, Many Africas: Reconstructing the Study and Meaning of Africa*, Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press
- Verhaegen, B. (1995) 'The African University: Evaluation and Perspectives', in E. Mudimbe (ed.), *The Surreptitious Speech: Presence Africaine and the Politics of Otherness - 1947-1987*, University of Chicago Press
- Wa Thiong'o, N. (1986) *Decolonising the Mind: The Politics of Language in African Literature*, Nairobi: Heinemann Kenya
- Yeikelo ya Ato, B. and Ntumba L. (1993) 'Ideology and Utopia', in K. Mbaya (ed.), *Zaire: What Destiny?*, Dakar: CODESRIA
- Zezeza, P. T. (1998) 'African Labour and Intellectual Migration to the North: Building New Transatlantic Bridges', symposium on African and African-American Intellectuals, Santiago, CA: University of California
- (2003) *Rethinking Africa's Globalisation: The Intellectual Challenge*, Trenton, NJ: African World Press
- Zewede, B. (1994) 'The Intellectual and the State in Twentieth Century Ethiopia', papers of the 12th International Conference of Ethiopian Studies held at Michigan State University